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REGULATION BY DATABASE
NATHAN CORTEZ*
The federal government currently publishes 196,284
searchable databases online, a number of which include
information about private parties that is negative or
unflattering in some way. Federal agencies increasingly
publish adverse data not just to inform the public or promote
transparency, but to pursue regulatory endsto change the
underlying behavior being reported. Such “regulation by
database” has become a preferred method of regulation in
recent years, despite scant attention from policymakers,
courts, or scholars on its appropriate uses and safeguards.
This Article evaluates the aspirations and burdens of
regulation by database. Based on case studies of six
important data sets (published by the CFPB, CPSC, EPA,
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FEC, FDA, and Medicare), the Article proposes what I call
“Good Government Data Practices” to ensure that databases
are reliable, useful, and fair. More optimal data disclosures
require careful design choices that consider both data inputs
and outputs, including how to gather and process data, how
to characterize them, and how to present them. The article
envisions a decidedly modern role for government agencies
as data “stewards” rather than as mere publishers or
repositories.
Agency databases have proliferated on the belief that
markets, regulation, and even democracy all require
transparency, that sunlight is the best disinfectant. But as
transparency has moved onlinebecoming more pervasive,
more powerful, and more burdened with regulatory
dimensionswe also must recognize that sunlight can blind
or even burn. It is in this spirit that I call for policymakers to
embrace the government’s role as a data “steward,” a sentinel
that helps maximize the quality of data inputs and outputs
via tailored procedures. The more reliable government data
are, the more they can enlighten us and perhaps even deter
unwanted behavior.
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Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.
 Louis D. Brandeis1
Perhaps we should blame it on Brandeis. As is so often the
case, the perfect turn of phrase often takes on a life of its
own, rendering more difficult the likelihood of careful and
balanced analysis of the topic to which the phrase, like a
barnacle, has become attached.
 Frederick Schauer2

INTRODUCTION
The federal government publishes tens of thousands of
searchable online databases from hundreds of sources. The site
Data.gov includes 196,284 unique data setsroughly 150,000
from the federal government, with the remainder from sub-

1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (Thoemmes Press 2003) (1914).
2. Frederick Schauer, The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency, 31
YALE J. REG. 809, 809 (2014).
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federal and nongovernmental sources.3 Some of these data sets
include information about private parties that is negative,
unflattering, or adverse in some way. For example, users can
search for consumer products that may have caused injuries;
for drugs that may have caused side effects; for lenders that
may have treated customers unfairly; for hospitals with higherthan-average mortality rates; for airlines that lose the most
luggage; for lobbyists that contribute to federal candidates; or
for nearby facilities that discharge toxic chemicals.
Federal agencies often publish these data not just to
inform the public or promote government transparency, but
also to pursue “regulatory” aimsto influence the
underlying behavior being reported. “Regulation by revelation”4
is not at all new, of course, with a lineage stretching back
decades.5 By now, disclosure has been so frequently used
as a tool to discourage certain conduct that it is easy
to take for granted. Though it is impossible to document all
regulatory frameworks that rely on disclosure, even a
partial list shows how ubiquitous it has become. We now
rely on disclosure to regulate food nutrition,6 fuel
economy,7 hospital quality,8 mortgages,9 securities,10 sex
3. Data Catalog, DATA.GOV, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset (last visited July
16, 2017) [http://perma .cc/6R8L-8VC4] (see “Organization Types” in the left
sidebar). Data.gov currently includes data from 166 federal agencies and
subagencies. See Federal Agency Participation, DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov/
metrics (last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WTJ6-RJGX]. Note that the
tally of data sets on Data.gov, including the disappearance of thousands, has been
tracked closely during the transition to the new Trump administration. See Juliet
Eilperin, Under Trump, Inconvenient Data is Being Sidelined, WASH. POST (May
14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/under-trump-inconvenientdata-is-being-sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674-437ddb6e813e_story
.html [https://perma.cc/MG8R-UJXC].
4. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 126 (2004).
5. For one of the first cross-disciplinary writings on regulation via disclosure,
see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
6. Nutritional Labeling Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2010).
7. See Download Fuel Economy Data, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml (last visited July 16, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/5B48-BKZE] (providing data back to 1978).
8. See discussion infra Section IV.E.
9. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1339, 1341 (2011).
10. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
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offenders,11 tire safety,12 toxic pollution,13 and workplace
chemical exposure,14 among many other species of conduct.
Disclosure has even become a preferred method of regulation
internationally.15
Although policymakers have relied on disclosure-based
regulation for decades,16 it has evolved from peculiarity to
regularity as the cost of disclosure online decreases and as
public demand increases. But disclosure also has evolved in
other important ways. For example, sometimes the real goal of
disclosure is to persuade rather than inform.17 After all, is the
Surgeon General’s Warning on tobacco products meant to tell
consumers something they do not already know? Or is it a
suggestion not to smoke? Today, disclosure-based regulation is
much less static (aimed narrowly at helping potential users of
the information make better decisions) and more dynamic
(aimed more broadly at trying to influence the disclosers’
underlying behavior).18 Frequently, the real party being
targeted by mandatory disclosure is not the consumer, but the
discloser,19 under the Brandeisian logic that shining a light on
undesired behavior will deter it, or at least make it more costly.

Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417
(2003).
11. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).
12. See
Transportation
Recall
Enhancement,
Accountability,
and
Documentation (TREAD) Act, § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 30170) (requiring manufacturers to disclose rollover risks for new vehicles). In
2007, Congress required that the information be placed on new car stickers. Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users,
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 23, and 49
U.S.C.).
13. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 11001 (1986).
14. See OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(2009) (requiring material safety data sheets in the workplace).
15. ARCHONG FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 127–50 (2007); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
24–25 (2004) (comparing “regulation by information” efforts by the United States
to those by the European Union and United Nations).
16. See, e.g., Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 491 (1981).
17. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 744 (2011).
18. Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 339 (2013).
19. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17.
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Disclosure, then, remains in bloom. And this bloom is
reflected in a relatively new species of disclosurethe
searchable online database. In Part I below, I detail how
agency databases derive from decades of federal policies
promoting government transparency, particularly recent
policies pushing the government to publish more information
online. Online publication reached a crescendo with the Obama
administration, which published an Open Government
Memorandum on the President’s first day in office20 and then
promoted scores of other transparency projects, including the
websites FOIA.gov and Data.gov. It is possible, if not likely,
that data transparency by federal agencies will experience a
diminuendo under the Trump administration,21 if not a more
aggressive, weaponized use of disclosure aimed at particular
parties.22
Nevertheless, decades of groundwork has enabled not only
a swell of government data initiatives, but also innovative
nongovernmental uses of these data. Thousands of government
data sets beget perhaps thousands more third-party websites,
mobile applications, and other informational products that rely
on government data. Perhaps the best example is the federal
government’s decision in the 1980s to publish Global
Positioning System (GPS) data for civilian use, which made
possible the recent wave of applications that incorporate
geospatial location data,23 such as navigation, restaurant, and
social media apps. Indeed, when President Obama announced
his “Open Data Policy,” he remarked that “[t]his kind of
20. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
21. For possibilities of reversals in government data policy, see Clare Malone,
How Trump’s White House Could Mess with Government Data, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 15, 2016, 6:29 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-trumps-whitehouse-could-mess-with-government-data/ [http://perma.cc/TQ6G-2G3Z].
22. For example, when Donald Trump took to Twitter to criticize the contract
price for Boeing to build a new Air Force One, Boeing stocks immediately dropped.
See Phillip Bump, Did Donald Trump Tank Boeing’s Stock Because He Was Mad
about a News Article?, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/06/did-donald-trump-tank-boeings-stock-because-hewas-mad-about-a-news-article/ [http://perma.cc/L9QM-6KQN].
23. SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING
NATIONAL POLICIES, app. B GPS HISTORY, CHRONOLOGY, AND BUDGETS (Rand
Corp. 1995), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sensing-sensors/readings/GPS_History-MR
614.appb.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7WZ-A267]; About, HEALTHDATA.GOV, http://www.
healthdata.gov/content/about (last visited July 16, 2017) [http://perma.cc/B2L7LZWV].
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innovation and ingenuity has the potential to transform the
way we do almost everything.”24 Lest readers discount this as
hyperbole, disclosure policies are often burdened by their
ambitionsbeing justified as promoting “autonomy, dignity,
civility, community, citizenship, economic growth, and a
variety of other virtues.”25 Part II examines these aspirations
in light of the emerging, somewhat sobering evidence.
Given the policy justifications, then, many rightly wonder
who could possibly oppose providing more information to the
public.26 But as ubiquitous as disclosure has become, criticisms
have emerged from scholars who doubt that it is “an unalloyed
good.”27 I consider the burdens of “regulation by database” in
detail in Part III, including problems with fairness, accuracy,
and efficacy. But for introductory purposes, Schauer captures
the skepticism well:
Secrecy, privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality also have
their virtues, and we can all understand why transparency
is a far more desirable attribute for sunroom windows than
it is for bathroom doors. At times, it seems that
transparency is a prime example of the old adage that
where you stand depends on where you sit.28

But policymakers rarely question whether the burdens of
disclosure outweigh its purported benefits.29 One goal of this

24. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President at Applied
Materials, Inc. - Austin, TX (May 9, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/photos-and-video/video/2013/05/09/president-obama-speaks-innovation-andmanufacturing [https://perma.cc/S46L-ZQ63].
25. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 734.
26. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xiii. Similarly, Fenster observes that
“transparency appears to provide such a remarkable array of benefits that no
right-thinking politician, administrator, policy wonk, or academic could be against
it.” Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–89
(2006).
27. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 1342; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra
note 17; Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL.
389 (2010); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J.
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012); Karen E.C. Levy & David Merritt Johns,
When Open Data Is a Trojan Horse: The Weaponization of Transparency in
Science and Governance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (Jan.–June 2016), http://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951715621568 [http://perma.cc/M4HP-VV4C].
28. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1342.
29. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 683 (“[L]awmakers rarely
inquire into the effectiveness or burden of disclosure.”).
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Article is to help correct this asymmetry with regard to an
increasingly important species of disclosurethe searchable
federal database. In Part IV, I evaluate prominent databases
published by six different agencies:
Agency Databases Evaluated
Agency

Database

CFPB

Consumer Complaint
Database

CPSC

SaferProducts.gov

CMS

Hospital Compare,
Physician Compare, etc.

EPA

Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI)

FDA

FDA Adverse Event
Reporting System
(FAERS), Manufacturer
and User Facility Device
Experience (MAUDE)

FEC

Campaign Finance
Disclosure Portal

Data
Complaints regarding
financial product or
service companies.
“Reports of harm” for
consumer products.
Medicare quality of care
metrics (such as
mortality rates), with
corresponding star
ratings.
Production and release
of roughly 650
dangerous chemicals by
facility name, address.
Adverse events
associated with drugs
(FAERS) and medical
devices (MAUDE)
reported to the FDA by
manufacturers, health
providers, consumers.
Mandatory reports
made by federal
candidates, parties,
committees, donors,
lobbyists, others.

Part IV considers which of these databases succeed in
producing reliable, usable data, and which have been able to
influence the underlying behavior being tracked. I also consider
how these databases suffer from different types of flaws,
including incomplete or inaccurate data, unfriendly user
interfaces, or databases whose costs of collection, maintenance,
and presentation likely outweigh their utility.
Part V offers thoughts on how policymakers can design
databases for more optimal disclosure, focusing on the inputs
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and outputs of published data, including procedural safeguards
to help ensure the quality and reliability of data. The
recommendations include pre- and post-publication procedures
for adjudicating “contested” data, evaluating administrative
law problems that might arise when databases are implicated
in enforcement actions, offering ideas on how to characterize
and present the data fairly and accurately, and drawing
lessons for agencies considering whether to publish “raw” or
“polished” data, as well as “big” or “small” data.
Together, these recommendations envision a decidedly
modern role for the government as a “data steward”30 rather
than merely as a data source or publisher. For example, there
are smart ways that the government can help gather and
generate more datamaking data “bigger.”31 But for some
information, it might be preferable for the government to distill
the data and make it more user-friendlymaking data
“smaller.”32 Either way, federal agencies can help ensure that
data collection practices are fair, that data that purport to be
accurate and objective meet those standards, and that the
sources and any important context or limitations for the data
are communicated clearly to users. In particular, policymakers
should resist the notion that more data is always better data.
Quality matters more than quantity. Part V thus builds on my
recent work for the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS), which recently adopted a narrower set of
recommendations on consumer complaint databases.33 We
might refer to these recommendations collectively as “Good
Government Data Practices.”
As the Article begins, consider the stakes. Successful data
policies can help ensure healthy markets, empower consumers,
inform citizens, and even influence the underlying conduct of
disclosers. Failed data policies, conversely, can produce
incomplete or “gerrymandered” information, create a false
30. Kristin Madison, Health Care Decisions in the New Era of Health Care
Reform: Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1607–08
(2014).
31. Id. at 1627–28.
32. Id.
33. ACUS Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259 (June 21,
2016); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Agency Information Dissemination in
the Internet Era, https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/agency-informationdissemin ation-internet-era (last visited July 16, 2017) [http://perma.cc/HP2BBWHY] [hereinafter ACUS].
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sense of security, waste resources, undermine public trust, and
even put lives at risk.34 To design databases for optimal
disclosure, we must also appreciate that disclosure is an
exercise of power, that “for one person or institution to have
information about another is for the former to have power over
the latter.”35 Similarly, “transparency” can be recharacterized
as “adverse transparency” if the information is unflattering or
harmful to the subject in some way.36 How, then, can
policymakers exercise this power responsibly and fairly? If we
value disclosure and accept it as a baseline, how do we best
manage it? As federal data is used more and more to achieve
regulatory ends, both the means and ends require more
purposeful policies.
I.

FROM OPEN GOVERNMENT TO OPEN INDUSTRY

Recent efforts to shine light on the activities of the
regulated derive from very old efforts to shine light on the
activities of regulators themselves. For decades, perhaps even
centuries,37 citizens have pushed the U.S. government to be
more open and transparent. Indeed, the long arc toward
government transparency is a defining hallmark of American
administrative law,38 sitting comfortably “among the pantheon
of great political virtues.”39 But today’s transparency emerged
only after decades of reforms, arriving roughly in four waves.
The 1930s brought efforts to publish so-called “secret laws”
generated by agencies during the New Deal. The 1940s brought
the Administrative Procedure Act’s mandates to give regulated
parties advanced notice of agency actions. The 1960s and 1970s

34. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 172.
35. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1347.
36. Sarah Taylor Roller et al., FDA’s Expanding Postmarket Authority to
Monitor and Publicize Food and Consumer Health Product Risks: The Need for
Procedural Safeguards to Reduce “Transparency” Policy Harms in the Post-9/11
Regulatory Environment, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 577, 597 (2009).
37. Article I, section 5 of the Constitution requires each chamber of Congress
to “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time to publish the same,”
which some view as a deliberate departure from the secrecy practiced by the
British Parliament. U.S. CONST. art. I § 5; James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls
and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1218
(2010).
38. William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative
LawThree Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009).
39. Fenster, supra note 26, at 888.
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introduced FOIA and the era of transparency by request. And
the 1990s and 2000s introduced mandates for agencies to post
information on the internet, establishing important agency
norms of online publication.
A.

Publishing “Secret Laws”

The New Deal birthed a generation of new executive
agencies and corresponding regulations. But agencies
published their regulations at will, if at all.40 One of the
earliest efforts to address the lack of transparency among
federal agencies was the Federal Register Act of 1935 (the 1935
Act),41 which created the now-familiar daily gazette of
executive documents. Before the 1935 Act, executive branch
agencies “would each publish their own regulations in various
separate publications, be they gazettes, bulletins, rulings,
digests, pamphlets, notices, codes, certificates, orders, and the
like.”42
The Act was motivated in part by the famous “hot oil” case,
Panama Refining.43 The “hot oil” law was part of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, the flagship New Deal bill passed
during the Great Depression.44 The National Industrial
Recovery Act authorized President Roosevelt, via the Secretary
of the Interior, to limit oil production and stabilize prices
during the discovery of vast new oil fields in Texas.45 During
litigation over the new authority, “the government was
embarrassed to admit that a reexamination of the relevant
documents (which were not publicly available) had revealed
that the Secretary had inadvertently revoked the relevant
regulation before the lawsuit had been filed.”46 Just weeks
before oral argument in the case, Erwin Griswold published a

40. Rick McKinney, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of
Federal Regulations, 46 LAW LIBR. INSIGHTS 10, 10 (2002), http://www.llsdc.org/
assets/sourcebook/fall02.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JG4-X54V].
41. 41 U.S.C. § 1501 (1935).
42. McKinney, supra note 40, at 10.
43. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
44. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
45. For a brief history on the discovery of new fields in Texas during that
time, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON
612–15 (1981).
46. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 446 (11th ed. 2011).
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law review article, Government in Ignorance of the Law,
arguing for a Federal-Register-like system to publish executive
branch laws.47 The “furor” over the case48 reflected
longstanding and “widespread dissatisfaction with the
unsystematic manner in which executive orders, agency
regulations, and similar materials were being made available
to the public.”49 As the federal government swelled with new
agencies and new regulations, frustration reached even highlevel government officials, who found it difficult, if not
impossible, to locate what became known as “secret laws.”50
Before 1935, agencies did not even have to publish the
regulations they imposed.51
B.

The APA and Notice

Publication requirements were further embedded in
American law by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA).52 The APA was a response, in part, to complaints from
industry that administrative agencies during the New Deal

47. Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the LawA Plea for
Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1934). Griswold,
the future U.S. Solicitor General and Dean of Harvard Law School, most likely
anticipated the Panama Refining decision. He was an attorney at the Solicitor
General’s office until 1934 during the briefing of the case. His article was
published the same month (December 1934) as oral argument in the case.
STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 446 n.4.
48. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 446 n.4 (citing Mary Whisner, A
Manual “to Inform Every Citizen,” 99 LAW LIBR. J. 159, 160 (2007); MORRIS L.
COHEN, ROBERT C. BERRING, & KENT C. OLSON, HOW TO FIND THE LAW 265 (9th
ed. 1989)).
49. See Cervase v. Office of the Fed. Register, 580 F.2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir.
1978) (“The basic object of this statutory reform was to eliminate secret law.”).
50. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE FEDERAL REGISTER MARCH 14, 1936 –
MARCH 14, 2006, at 2 (2006), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/
fr_history.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3L5-B6HS]; STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at
445–46.
51. Funk, supra note 38, at 172. Decades later, in 1993, Congress required the
Government Printing Office (GPO) to make the Federal Register available on the
Internet. Government Printing Office Information Access Enhancement Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-40, 107 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§
4101–4104).
52. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). States later passed
their own administrative procedure acts, often modeled on the federal APA, thus
incorporating the same publication requirements and principles. See MICHAEL A.
ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3–5 (4th
ed. 2014).
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were too opaque and insular, particularly towards the private
interests most affected by regulation.53 The original APA, in
section 3, required agencies to publish important materials in
the Federal Register, and in fact prohibited agencies from
enforcing rules not published there.54 New APA procedures
creating “notice and comment” rulemaking have since become a
hallmark of citizen participation in government.55 Today, the
APA requires agencies to publish a wide variety of information
in the Federal Register, including basic information about their
organizational structure, procedures, and substantive rules.56
However, many eventually came to view APA section 3
more as a tool to withhold information than disclose it.57 And
even between the Federal Register Act and the APA, a
significant portion of agency documentsguidance, opinions,
and other important “soft law” adopted by agencieswere not
available in the Federal Register. Just as before 1935, such
documents were accessible only on a haphazard basis.58
Moreover, the APA’s disclosure provisions were largely
designed to give notice to those whose legal rights were directly
affected by the agency action, which were “almost invariably
businesses.”59
Indeed,
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
procedures were premised on the view that regulated parties,
rather than the public at large, should be given notice and an
opportunity to comment on proposed rules.60 As Bill Funk
observes, the APA addressed participation in rulemaking to
“interested persons,” meaning those with a “direct and palpable
interest,”61 and required that public records be made available
to persons “properly and directly concerned,” rather than the

53. Funk, supra note 38, at 172–73, 178.
54. APA § 3, 60 Stat. at 238.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out)
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
79, 85 (2012); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53
EMORY L.J. 433, 517 (2004).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012).
57. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 451.
58. Id.
59. Funk, supra note 38, at 173.
60. Id.; ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 2 (1941).
61. Funk, supra note 38, at 174.
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general public.62 Thus, the APA’s disclosure provisions were
aimed to inform regulated parties, not shine a light on them, as
became the focus decades later.
C.

FOIA and Transparency by Request

If the APA is viewed as a reaction to agency hostility
towards regulated businesses, then the 1960s and 1970s could
be viewed as a movement toward recognizing the public
interest on equal footing.63 The modern open government
movement really began in 1967, when Congress passed the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),64 requiring agencies to
index and make public vast amounts of materials not published
in the Federal Register. Like the APA, FOIA was motivated in
part by the desire to ensure an informed citizenry.65 President
Lyndon Johnson, who signed the bill reluctantly and only
under pressure from the press corps,66 noted that FOIA
“springs from one of our most essential principles: a democracy
works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the nation will permit.”67 Half a century later,
modern scholars still acknowledge FOIA’s importance to our
democratic government.68 In requiring the government to make
its records available upon request unless specifically exempted,

62. APA, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Funk explains that these goals derive
in part from the canonical work by James Landis, The Administrative Process.
Funk, supra note 38, at 177 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938)).
63. Funk, supra note 38, at 178–80.
64. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996)). The original FOIA was enacted in 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, but was repealed and replaced after Congress
enacted Title 5 of the U.S. Code into positive law by the 1967 version, which was
identical in substance. Vladeck has characterized FOIA as “truly an experiment in
open government.” David C. Vladeck, Information Access – Surveying the Current
Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1795
(2008).
65. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. H13007 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (statement of
Rep. Moss).
66. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1798.
67. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Statement on Signing the
Freedom of Information Act (July 4, 1966), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%2031.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6YQ-E7XC].
68. Vladeck, supra note 64 (noting that FOIA “embodies the ideal that
information is the lifeblood of democracy”).

2018]

REGULATION BY DATABASE

15

FOIA created a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure.”69
In fact, it reversed the burden in the original APA that opened
access to government records only if the requester could
demonstrate a compelling need.70
FOIA, of course, has been criticized for falling short of its
lofty goals of pursuing democracy through transparency and
accountability.71 A major complaint is that FOIA produces
transparency only by request.72 It imposes few affirmative
disclosure obligations on agencies, and relies on a complex
framework that often requires relatively sophisticated private
intermediaries with sufficient “time, money, and expertise” to
“press a recalcitrant administration for disclosure.”73 Scholars
have also criticized FOIA for being too malleable, particularly
under
administrations
that
construe
its
disclosure
requirements narrowly and exemptions broadly (the George W.
Bush administration is frequently cited).74 As such, FOIA
envisions passive disclosure by agencies rather than active
disclosure or publication of the information they hold.75
Moreover, the basic premise of FOIA’s “request-and-wait-for-aresponse approach” is seen as obsolete in the Internet era.76
D.

The Internet Era

In the 1990s, as the internet came of age, a series of laws
pushed the government to use it. For example, the Paperwork

69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991).
70. 4 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1964), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(4) (Supp. III
1964).
71. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 88–89 (citing several articles and at least
one law, the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our Nation (OPEN)
Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.)).
72. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1789.
73. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008); Shkabatur, supra note 55,
at 89; Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1789.
74. Scholars often point to the George W. Bush administration on this point.
President Bush instructed federal agencies to deny FOIA requests when they
could invoke a “sound legal basis.” Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y
Gen., to the Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001); Vladeck, supra
note 64, at 1790; Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 89.
75. Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the
Internet Era, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1438–39 (2011).
76. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1792–93.
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Reduction Act of 1995,77 the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act of 1996 (sometimes called “E-FOIA”),78 and the
Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 199879 directed
federal agencies to use the internet to publish more
information online and to “improve the productivity, efficiency,
and effectiveness of Federal programs.”80 In particular, E-FOIA
required agencies to publish online their final opinions and
orders, as well as records likely to be requested,81 thus
spawning the surge in agency online “reading rooms.”82
During this time, regulators began to rely more on
mandatory reporting to inform agency actions, including both
rulemaking and enforcement. Somewhat quickly, internet
technologies reduced the costs of gathering and disseminating
such information online, which increased both public demand
and expectations for agency records. Thus, federal agencies
began to publish copious amounts of information not just about
their own activities, but about regulated parties as well.83
In the 2000s, as federal agencies built sprawling
websites,84 a new generation of laws pushed for even more
online disclosure. For example, the E-Government Act of 2002
required federal agencies to post more information online and
make it more accessible through improved organization.85 The
Act also created the Office of Electronic Government within the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), headed by a Chief
Information Officer that would coordinate with agencies
through a Council.86 As with prior laws, the stated goal of the
E-Government Act was to encourage the federal government to
enhance public access to information and government services,

77. Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §
3504(h)(5)).
78. Pub. L. No. 101-231, 110 Stat. 347 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
79. Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XVII, § 1702, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 44
U.S.C. § 3504).
80. Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §
3504(h)(5)).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D).
82. Presidential Statement on Signing the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1949 (Oct. 2, 1996).
83. James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for
Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (2003).
84. Id.; Cortez, supra note 75, at 1393.
85. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
86. Id.
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this time using internet technologies.87 In 2007, the Open
Government Act addressed various frustrations with FOIA,
requiring new agency procedures and new public liaison offices
designed to address persistent agency delays in responding to
FOIA requests.88
Likewise, during the 2000s, Congress also passed laws
requiring more transparency in federal spending, directing the
OMB to publish online the details of federal grants, loans, and
contracts.89 Today, the public can search the federal website
USAspending.gov to view entities that have received federal
money,90 or more narrowly focused sites like Recovery.gov to
see how the federal government has spent money from the
economic stimulus package of 2009.91 The former includes a
searchable database with the name and location of the entity
receiving federal money, the amount received, the type of
transaction, the funding body, the purpose of the funding, and
other information.92 As Vladeck notes, the site “was able to
piggyback on the work of OMB Watch, a nonprofit watchdog
organization that with foundation support had already
constructed a comprehensive, searchable database that is also

87. Id. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 2902 (defining “electronic government”).
88. Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
89. E-Government Act of 2002; Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186 (codified at 31
U.S.C. § 6101).
90. See USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov (last visited Aug. 3,
2017) [https://perma.cc/2LDE-WR48].
91. U.S. RECOVERY ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANS. BD., http://www.recovery.
gov. The site and its data were removed after the Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board declined to renew a license with Dun & Bradstreet, a firm
that assigned identification numbers for all entities doing business with the U.S.
Government. See Christian Davenport, Data on $800 Billion in Stimulus
Spending Will Disappear This Year. Here is Why., WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/data-on-800-billion-instimulus-spending-will-disappear-this-year-here-is-why/2014/09/09/ad277ff4-350a
-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html [https://perma.cc/V62M-ZMM5]. In 2012, the
U.S. House passed a bill that would publish even more online data about federal
spending, and would have created a Federal Accountability and Spending
Transparency Commission to implement the new provisions. See Digital
Accountability and Transparency (DATA) Act, H.R. 2146, 112th Cong. (2012). The
bill died in the Senate. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Bill Summary & Status,
112th Congress (2011-12), H.R. 2146, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d112:h.r.02146 (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ N256-82W7].
92. Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat.1187; see also USASPENDING.GOV,
supra note 90.
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available free of charge to the public.”93 This work reflects a
marked shift from focusing on information about the
government to information about private parties.
In 2001, Congress passed an important but less frequently
discussed law, the Information Quality Act (IQA), sometimes
referred to as the Data Quality Act (DQA).94 The Act required
the OMB to issue government-wide guidelines for “ensuring
and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information . . . disseminated by the government.”95 It also
required the OMB to “establish administrative mechanisms
allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of
information maintained and disseminated by the agency” that
does not meet those standards.96 In 2002, the OMB finalized
guidelines implementing the Act,97 followed by agencies issuing
their own guidelines.98
These IQA guidelines would seem well suited to regulate
the quality of information posted in agency databases. Yet the
Act’s application to databases is highly unclear, and probably
varies by database. The broad wording of the IQA states that
the OMB guidelines should apply to agency “dissemination of
public information, regardless of the form or format.”99 And the
OMB guidelines define “information” as “any communication or
representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any
93. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1829–30 (citing About, FEDSPENDING.ORG,
http://www.fedspending.org/aboutthissite.php (last visited August 1, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/QPC2-7ZT5]). Note that OMB Watch later changed its name to
the Center for Effective Government, but ended operations in March 2016,
transferring most of its resources to the Project on Government Oversight
(POGO). See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org (last
visited June 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7GF7-LGSD].
94. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. §
3516 (2012).
95. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515. The Information Quality Act built on earlier requirements in the
Paperwork Reduction Act that addressed information dissemination. See
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, 168.
96. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515.
97. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,489 (June 28, 2001) (proposed guidelines); 66 Fed. Reg.
49,718 (Sept. 28, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb.
22, 2002).
98. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Agency Information Quality Guidelines,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg_agency_info_quality_links/
(last visited July 15, 2015) [https://perma.cc/8YZZ-PKRF].
99. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1).
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medium or form,”100 including “information that an agency
disseminates from a web page.”101 However, the OMB excludes
from coverage “opinions, where the agency’s presentation
makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion
rather than fact or the agency’s views.”102 The guidelines also
exempt “adjudicative processes.”103 These exemptions might
thus exclude important agency databases, such as the CFPB’s
Consumer Complaint Database.104
All this is prelude, however, to the Obama administration
and its efforts toward open government. On his first full day in
office, President Obama published the Open Government
Memorandum,105 as well as a memorandum on FOIA.106
Although various internet-driven transparency initiatives
emerged during the Clinton and Bush administrations, the two
Obama documents were viewed as a gesture toward openness
and a turn from the secrecy that characterized the Bush
administration.107
In December 2009, the OMB published the Open
Government Directive,108 following on President Obama’s Open
Government Memorandum, urging agencies to “take prompt
steps to expand access to information by making it available
online in open formats.”109 The directive required each agency,
within 45 days, to “identify and publish online in an open
format at least three high-value data sets . . . on Data.gov” that

100. 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458–59.
101. Id. at 8460.
102. 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 377.
103. Id.
104. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
105. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21,
2009). As Shkabatur notes, “[d]ozens of other countries” have followed this
example. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 80 (citing OPEN GOVERNMENT
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.opengovpartnership.org (last visited July 15, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/R85P-AWL5]).
106. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:
Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
107. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 441. Of course, even the Obama
administration has been criticized for rejecting more transparency in matters of
terrorism and national security. Jeff Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017).
108. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
109. Id. at 2.
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had previously not been available.110 Within sixty days, each
agency was to create an Open Government web page. Today,
eighty different federal agencies and subagencies have posted
196,284 datasets on Data.gov.111
In 2011, the Justice Department created FOIA.gov, a
website that publicizes data on how agencies have performed
their FOIA duties.112 The searchable online database displays
the number of FOIA requests received by each agency, the
disposition of those requests, and the current backlog.
Ironically, like other mandatory disclosure regimes, the Justice
Department is using “naming and shaming” to encourage
agencies to be more responsive to FOIA requests.113 Still,
scholars question how effectively “naming and shaming” is at
convincing under-performing agencies to increase their
responsiveness to FOIA requests.114
As this history shows, federal transparency efforts
gradually evolved from general right-to-know laws like FOIA,
aimed at increasing transparency in the government itself, to
disclosure of information held by the government regarding the
activities of corporations and regulated entities.115 Thus, the
current gestalt that pursues transparency from industry owes
much to earlier right-to-know efforts that pursued
transparency from government.116 Moreover, as with so many
other things, information technology has enabled the use of
databases and disclosure as a regulatory tool. Internet
technologies are being used to mine the data of countless
industries and activities, post them in the public domain, and
make them accessible through searching, sorting, and other
data-sifting tools.

110. Id.
111. Federal Agency Participation, supra note 3.
112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov
(last visited Jan. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AQ6A-PE9Q ].
113. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 100.
114. Id.
115. See also FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xii–xiii. They call this “targeted
transparency.” Id.
116. Id. at 28. Of course, one could support more transparency from
government without supporting more transparency from industry, and vice versa.
But the two trends seem to be part of the same historical arc towards more public
reporting and openness by regulatory agencies.
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II. DATA AND ITS ASPIRATIONS
Agency databases have become ubiquitous in part because
they appeal to so many of our intuitions about how
government, markets, and regulation should work. So much so,
in fact, that disclosure skeptics criticize the optimists for too
often posing it as a panaceaa Swiss Army policy “intended to
promote autonomy, dignity, civility, community, citizenship,
economic growth, and a variety of other virtues.”117
Contemporary scholarship, of course, has focused on the many
ways in which internet technologies have facilitated
communication between the government and the public.118 But
after years of scholarly praise of the internet’s role in
facilitating transparency, accountability, and democracy,
inevitable critiques have emerged.119 Still, disclosure
frequently is offered as a tool that can achieve market,
regulatory, and democratic ideals.120
A.

Market Ideals

A frequently invoked rationale for regulatory disclosures is
that disclosure can improve consumer decision-making,
facilitate markets, and “protect the naïve from the
sophisticated.”121 Various disclosure regimes, at their heart, try
to resolve the famous “lemons problem” framed by George
Akerloff, who argued that in markets with information
asymmetries between buyers and sellers, sellers may have an
incentive to sell inferior products or services, which can

Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 734.
For just a small sample, see, e.g., BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER
(W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2003); STEPHEN COLEMAN & JAY G.
BLUMLER, THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THEORY, PRACTICE AND
POLICY (2009).
119. See, e.g., MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2003);
EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM
(2011).
120. Indeed, Sage evaluated these types of justifications almost twenty years
ago, characterizing them somewhat differently as four separate rationales
(competition, agency, performance, and democratic). See Sage, supra note 5, at
1710–11. He also observes, however, that disclosure rationales can often be
contradictory or at least in tension. Id.
121. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 649.
117.
118.
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undermine the market.122 By requiring disclosure, the
government can correct these asymmetries and facilitate
efficient markets. Schauer calls this “transparency as
efficiency”the idea that freely available information “is
precisely what makes markets operate effectively.”123
At their best, agency databases can inspire a “race to the
top” by encouraging firms to compete based on their published
activities. One of the original aspirations for the CFPB’s
Consumer Complaint Database was to encourage companies to
use the data to publicize how well they respond to consumer
complaints compared to competitors.124 The Bureau points to
this phenomenon in the airline industry, where airlines use
data by the Department of Transportation and FAA to market
their low rates of passenger complaints compared to
competitors, and where third party airline ratings systems
make use of the same government data.125 The Bureau
concludes that after the data is made public, “The marketplace
of ideas then does the rest.”126
Disclosure thus satisfies both our free-market intuitions127
and the policymaker’s urge to do something. In the law that
created the CFPB, Congress repeatedly asserted that the
Bureau would publish information that helped consumers
make more informed choices about financial products and
services128a refrain repeated frequently by the Bureau in its

122. George A. Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the used car market as
an example).
123. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1350.
124. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628,
76,630 n.9 (Dec. 8, 2011).
125. Id. at 76,631.
126. Id. Of course, airlines now face a new form of naming and shaming from
customers themselves, who can record and publish examples of poor customer
service. See, e.g., Avi Selk, A Man Wouldn’t Leave an Overbooked United Flight.
So He Was Dragged Off, Battered and Limp., WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/04/10/a-man-wouldntleave-an-overbooked-united-flight-so-he-was-dragged-off-battered-and-limp/
[https://perma.cc/8V5B-VEE6].
127. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 681.
128. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1021, 124 Stat. 1979 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C.§§ 5511(b)(1), (5))
(tasking the Bureau with providing consumers “timely and understandable
information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions” and help
the market “operate transparently and efficiently”).
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own publications.129 Consumer advocates, in fact, have
encouraged the Bureau’s database efforts by arguing that
“disclosure is one of the best tools government agencies can
use.”130
A related consumer-centered ideal served by disclosure is
autonomy. As Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue, mandated
disclosure is alluring because “[i]t supposes that people make
better decisions for themselves than anyone can make for them
and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions.”131
Countless mandatory disclosure laws rely on this logic.132 The
CFPB’s complaint data, the CPSC’s product safety data, and
many other data sets are predicated on consumers using the
data to vote with their wallets, avoiding substandard
performers.133
Finally, corporations and industry groups often “urge
greater transparency as an alternative to allegedly more
heavy-handed regulation.”134 Of course, many scholars embrace
this view as well.135 As Archon Fung and colleagues emphasize,
the “ingeniousness” of regulation via disclosure “lies in its
mobilization of individual choice, market forces, and
participatory democracy through relatively light-handed
government action.”136 Regulation by disclosure thus appeals
across both political and ideological spectra.
B.

Regulatory Ideals

A second aspiration of disclosure is to achieve regulatory
endsusing publication to preempt or at least deter undesired
behavior. Corporate and securities law, for example, rely
heavily on disclosure of company holdings and transactions,
with the idea that corporations whose dealings are transparent

129. See, e.g., Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,218,
21,225 (Apr. 10, 2013).
130. Id. at 21,220.
131. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 681.
132. Id. (citing examples from the FTC and others).
133. See discussion infra Sections IV.C and IV.D.
134. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1341 (citing L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion,
Transparency is More Powerful Than Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2009, at
A21; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Disclosure is the Best Kind
of Credit Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A17).
135. See, e.g., Crovitz, supra note 134; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 134.
136. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
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and publicly accessible will think twice before acting in ways
that harm investors.137 Similarly, requiring hospitals to
publish mortality rates is really a device to encourage hospitals
to reduce mortality rates.138 Again, the same logic motivates
many disclosure regimes, with a long lineage. In 1796, Jeremy
Bentham observed that “the more strictly we are watched, the
better we behave.”139
Agencies also frequently use databases to publish
compliance and enforcement data.140 Scholars have called for
agencies to actively publish enforcement records that are
available under FOIA but must be requested.141 For example,
David Vladeck argues that Congress should require the OMB
to compile enforcement records in a searchable database to
“permit the public to track repeat-offender corporations in the
same way the public can now track grants and contracts given
to the same corporate recipients.”142 For years, a nonprofit
based at Syracuse University, called the Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), has published enforcement data
gathered via FOIA from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).143
137. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1347; Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory
Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 81 (2007); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation As Lobster Trap: A
Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675
(2002); Sage, supra note 5, at 1780 (noting that the “SEC penalizes faulty
disclosure, not faulty performance”).
138. Michael B. Rothberg et al., Choosing the Best Hospital: The Limitations of
Public Quality Reporting, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1680 (2008); Schauer, supra note 9, at
1348.
139. Jeremy Bentham, Farming Defended, in 1 WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS
276, 277 (Michael Quinn ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001 (1796)); Schauer, supra
note 9, at 1352.
140. See discussion infra Part IV, regarding several examples from the EPA,
FEC, FDA, etc.
141. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1830–31.
142. Id. at 1830.
143. Id.; TRAC: About Us, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/L9NF-VZ4R]. The FTC maintains a massive database of complaints
against companies, though it is nonpublic and is available only to enforcement
agencies, such as the FTC, Department of Justice, and participating state and
local agencies. Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consu mer-sentinel-network (last visited July 15,
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Enforcement
data
may
also
help
counter
underenforcement by agencies, what Matthew Stephenson calls
“agency slack.”144 Scholars note widespread underenforcement
by a variety of agencies in a variety of contexts.145 Even when
agencies do pursue regulatory violations, they often fail to
enforce them.146 Underenforcement may derive from several
sourcesinsufficient agency resources, ideology, antiregulatory pressures, political oversight, inertia, or agency selfinterest.147 Regardless of the contributors, making compliance
and enforcement data public might inspire agencies to reach
more optimal levels of enforcementor even inspire companies
to reach more optimal levels of compliance. Observers also
suspect the converse. When the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) “abruptly removed inspection reports, warning letters,
and other documents on nearly 8000 animal facilities that the
agency regulates” from its website in February 2017, critics
worried that the move would shield violators from journalists
and animal rights groups.148
If publication alone does not encourage compliance,
perhaps use of the data by third-party intermediaries can. In
justifying its Consumer Complaint Database, the CFPB
pointed to companies offering commercial intelligence products
based on data from the FDA’s drug and device adverse events
databases (FAERS and MAUDE).149 The CFPB itself notes that

2017) [https://perma.cc/6Z24-SBVJ]; see NATHAN CORTEZ, ADMIN. CONFERENCE
THE
U.S., AGENCY PUBLICITY IN THE INTERNET ERA (2015)
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/agency-publicity-in-theinternet-era.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 6Z24-SBVJ].
144. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110
(2005).
145. See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 173, 220–21 (2014); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1126–29 (2009); Stephenson, supra note 144, at
116–17; Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 323 (2011).
146. See, e.g., Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap:
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 453, 473–74 (2011).
147. Stephenson, supra note 144.
148. Meredith Wadman, Courts Ponder How Public Animal Reports Must Be,
356 SCIENCE 790, 790 (2017).
149. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558,
37,562 (June 22, 2012) (citing Melinda Beck, Searching for Side Effects, WALL ST.
J.: HEALTH J. (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020
OF
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third-party users, like the consulting firm Deloitte and the U.S.
News & World Report, are relying on the Bureau’s data to
publish findings and recommendations.150 Moreover, there is
always the lingering fear that shareholders, plaintiffs’ lawyers,
media, bloggers, or other enforcement agencies will use
published data against companies.
An emerging potential use of government data, and one
encouraged by the government itself, is “crowdsourcing.”
Crowdsourcing is a method of soliciting answers, ideas,
resources, or services from a large network of people, typically
online.151 Technologists have envisioned the government
serving as a “platform” for innovation by providing data that
inspires outside parties to create innovative uses for the
data.152 Government agencies cannot predict how their data
sets might be used by the public, but the act of publishing data
in raw, open, and machine-readable format allows the public to
generate innovative and perhaps more enlightening uses of the
data.153
The Obama administration pursued several crowdsourcing
initiatives, published on websites like Challenge.gov, which
features various prize competitions sponsored by over eighty
federal agencies.154 The site claims that the government has
awarded “[m]ore than $250 million in prize money” since
2010.155 The idea is that “U.S. federal agencies invite the
public’s help to solve perplexing mission-centric problems.”156
Indeed, even the administration’s original Open Government
Directive offered contests and prizes that incentivized the

3920204577193052426275904
[https://perma.cc/872W-TUP2]
(referring
to
products by AdverseEvents, Inc. and Clarimed, LLC)).
150. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 66.
151. Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/crowdsourcing (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.
cc/YB4X-TV3S].
152. See, e.g., Tim O’Reilly, Government as a Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT:
COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 11 (Daniel
Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 110.
153. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 109.
154. About, CHALLENGE.GOV, http://www.challenge.gov/about/ (last visited July
15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ENV8-9HCT].
155. Id.
156. Id.
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public to “tinker” with the data released.157 Thus, some of the
most provocative uses of agency data may just be emerging.
C.

Democratic Ideals

A third and more lofty justification for publishing
government data is to enhance government accountability.158
Transparency is often assumed to be its precondition.159
Leading thinkerssuch as John Milton, John Stuart Mill,
James Madison, Oliver Wendell Holmes (father of the
marketplace of ideas),160 and Louis Brandeishave long drawn
an explicit link between transparency, accountability, and
democracy.161 Centuries of writing are filled with paeans to the
virtues of transparency. Today, the modern open source
movement, which owes much to these forebears and helped
seed the open government movement, holds that information is
a necessary precondition for truth and progress.162 Seen in this
way, agency databases are a logical vehicle for both
technological and democratic progress.

157. Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Ser. No. M-10-11 (2010); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at
111 n.173.
158. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 80; Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets,
Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV.
909, 917 (2006).
159. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685
(Jan. 21, 2009); Fenster, supra note 26, at 894–99; Shkabatur, supra note 55, at
83.
160. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
161. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.” As FUNG ET AL., supra note
15, at 24, discuss, this language is carved on the Library of Congress building);
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the
power of [an assertion] to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3 (1984).
162. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1350. However, despite the fanfare, some
scholars question whether recent transparency and open government initiatives
actually “strengthen public accountability.” See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 55, at
81. Shkabatur argues that current transparency policies, driven by new
technologies, give agencies too much control over which data are published,
“prioritizes quantity over quality of disclosures,” and reinforces older barriers to
accessing information. Id.
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Government databases can also serve an expressive
function by acting as a conduit for consumers to air their
Presidents
Kennedy
and
Nixon
both
grievances.163
promulgated a Consumer Bill of Rights to pose the government
as an intermediary or a tribunal through which consumer
complaints could be given a voice.164 Such a role can increase
the public’s confidence in government, providing “a positive
point of contact” between agencies and citizens, and promoting
the idea of “government as a positive force in society.”165 The
CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database essentially serves this
role today.
In short, there are compelling reasons why data disclosure
appeals to policymakers so much. Disclosure seems consistent
with free-market and autonomy principles, and seems to be an
easy and effective intervention compared to more traditional
regulation.166 Politically, regulation by disclosure is cast as a
“path of least resistance for administrative agencies seeking to
promote meaningful change.”167 Indeed, calls for disclosure and
transparency are often justified, on a more fundamental plane,
as furthering the pursuit of truth, knowledge, and societal
progress.168
III. DATA AND ITS DISCONTENTS
But does disclosure live up to its many promises? In this
Part, I consider the shortcomings of database disclosures,
before evaluating several prominent agency databases in Part
IV. Part V then considers ways to design databases for more
optimal, effective disclosure.

163. Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s
Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 75–76 (2012). Again,
there is a large literature on the expressive function of disclosure regimes. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996). Contra Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
164. Porter, supra note 163, at 76; Special Message to the Congress on
Protecting the Consumer Interest, 1962 PUB. PAPERS 235, 236 (Mar. 15, 1962);
Special Message to the Congress on Consumer Protection, 1969 PUB. PAPERS 883,
883 (Oct. 30, 1969).
165. Porter, supra note 163, at 76.
166. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 681–82.
167. Sage, supra note 5, at 1772.
168. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1350.
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First and foremost, agency disclosure of information about
regulated parties can itself cause a variety of harms, ranging
from concrete (a devaluation of stock price) to less tangible,
reputational harms.169 Although scholarship on these harms is
not voluminous, the harms are relatively well documented.170
For example, in 2008 the FDA and CDC mistakenly identified
tomatoes as the source of a salmonella outbreak, costing the
tomato industry an estimated $200 million in lost sales.171 And
there are numerous instances in which a company’s stock value
plummeted after an agency announcement criticized the
company.172 As Vladeck notes, “[t]here is also force, as a
general matter, to the argument that companies should not be
subject to commercial harm simply because they are compelled
to report their activities to the government.”173
Questions about the value of so-called “naming and
shaming” have crept into various disciplines.174 In the book Is
Shame Necessary?, Jennifer Jacquet considers the virtues and
flaws of modern naming and shaming, particularly how social
media and other modern modes of communication might
amplify shame effectively to change the behavior of
corporations or even governments.175 Indeed, organizations like
Wikileaks derive tremendous power and influence from
disclosurethe kind of nongovernmental power normally
reserved for mainstream media.176

169. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1380 (1973); Cortez, supra note 75; CORTEZ, supra note 143, at
9–12.
170. For just a few examples, see James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How
OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency
Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835 (2002); O’Reilly, supra note 83; Lars
Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations
of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 874 (1997); Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016).
171. Denis G. Maki, Coming to Grips with Foodborne InfectionPeanut Butter,
Peppers, and Nationwide Salmonella Outbreaks, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949
(2009).
172. See Cortez, supra note 75 (discussing examples); see also CORTEZ, supra
note 143, at 9–12.
173. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1793 (noting, however, that secrecy should give
way to publication, for example, when necessary to avoid death or serious injury).
174. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY
ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983).
175. JENNIFER JACQUET, IS SHAME NECESSARY: NEW USES FOR AN OLD TOOL
(2015).
176. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 135–36.
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Less sanguine views argue that “shaming is the very
antithesis of the law,”177 particularly when wielded by the
government. For example, Donald Trump’s Twitter posts, the
focus of significant handwringing, demonstrate the unfair
destructive power of adverse publicity. In December 2016,
Boeing stock took a quick plunge after President-elect Trump
took to Twitter to criticize the cost of Boeing’s contract to build
a new Air Force One.178 After the episode, some investors and
market analysts began to monitor Trump’s tweets for potential
market-moving proclamations.179
A second objection to the use of disclosure as a regulatory
tool is that it may be ineffective. There is growing scholarly
skepticism that openness necessarily leads to knowledge or
that more information necessarily produces better decisions.180
As David Vladeck observes, “there is now a significant and
growing dissonance between the promises made by our federal
right-to-know laws and their performance.”181 And as BenShahar and Schneider emphasize in their magisterial article,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, disclosure regimes often
fail completely in meeting their goals, and in fact can have
unintended consequences that hinder them.182 Although their
bearish views are challenged,183 the virtues of disclosure no
longer remain uncontested.
A third objection to agency disclosure in general, and to
databases in particular, is that they are not always complete or
accurate. To be most useful, data that purport to present
truthful, objective information must meet those standards.

177. Eric Posner, A Terrible Shame: Enforcing Moral Norms Without Law Is
No Way to Create a Virtuous Society, SLATE (Apr. 9, 2015, 11:14 A.M.),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/04/inter
net_shaming_the_legal_history_of_shame_and_its_costs_and_benefits.html
[https://perma.cc/TT6K-GEB5].
178. Bump, supra note 22.
179. Alyssa Sims, The Stock Market Needs to Gird Itself for Trump’s Tweets,
SLATE (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/
12/the_stock_market_needs_to_gird_itself_for_trump_s_tweets.html
[https://perma.cc/N6FU-V7ZF].
180. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1351.
181. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1792.
182. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17.
183. Craswell, supra note 18; Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture
of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015); Kristin Madison,
Health Care Quality Reporting: A Failed Form of Mandated Disclosure?, 13 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 310 (2016).
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Otherwise, they risk succumbing to a problem known well to
computer and software engineers: “Garbage in, garbage out.”184
Flawed inputs produce flawed outputs, and inaccurate
databases will be unreliable. Even well-known advocates of
regulation by information, such as Cass Sunstein, acknowledge
the dangers of regulating based on flawed data.185 Litigation
challenging
inaccurate
reports
on
the
CPSC’s
SaferProducts.gov database demonstrates that agencies
sometimes post inaccurate data, and sometimes that data
lingers online for years before it is corrected or retracted.186
The FEC’s campaign finance data is widely acknowledged to be
incomplete.187 The FDA’s medical device database, which
tracks problems with devices and is subject to mandatory
reporting requirements, is undermined dramatically by underreporting.188 Even relatively noncontroversial databases like
USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov have been found to have
widespread inaccuracies.189 Both the OMB and GAO have
acknowledged that data on the sites has been inaccurate,
untimely, or incomplete.190 An independent review by the
Sunlight Foundation found that the sites had “over 1.2 trillion
dollars’ worth of misreported spending in 2009 alone.”191

184. Garbage in, garbage out, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/garbage_in,_garbage_out (last visited July 15,
2017) [https://perma.cc/LF2P-4VDK].
185. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 755–60 (1999).
186. See, e.g., Co. Doe v. Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d
sub nom. Co. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
187. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
188. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-21, MEDICAL DEVICE
REPORTING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S SYSTEM FOR MONITORING
PROBLEMS WITH APPROVED DEVICES (1997), http://www.gao.gov/products/HEHS97-21 [https://perma.cc/65CQ-WF8W].
189. See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 103.
190. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-09-21,
IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE FOR THE REPORTS ON USE OF FUNDS PURSUANT TO THE
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, at 27 (2009),
https://ojp.gov/recovery/pdfs/arrafundsmemo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5AZL-FLRY];
Memorandum from Robert Shea, Assoc. Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Fed.
Agencies 3 (Mar. 6, 2008) (on file with author).
191. Transparency Through Technology: Evaluating Federal Open-Government
Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations, and Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Ellen Miller, Executive Director,
Sunlight Foundation); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 103.
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Inaccurate or incomplete data sets can be even more
problematic if agencies process them with software algorithms
or artificial intelligence to identify regulatory violators or
single out firms for further investigation.192 The use of such
algorithms for regulatory enforcement purposes raises a host of
novel questions about agency delegations, justifications, and
reasoning.193 Moreover, increased skepticism of the accuracy
and objectivity of algorithmic decision making warrants further
investigation, particularly as regulators rely on these methods
more.194
A related criticism of agency databases is that they often
present data without appropriate context.195 Jennifer
Shkabatur notes that it is hard for a lay person browsing
USASpending.gov, for example, to evaluate whether a $20
million contract between the Department of Commerce and
Industrial Economics for “continued support for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill” is money well-spent, or whether an $817
million contract between the Department of Defense and
Lockheed Martin for “incremental funding” is wasteful.196 But
that is the only information provided. Thus, she argues, “even
if data is timely and reliable,” when stripped of context, it may
not always be particularly meaningful or useful.197 Providing
appropriate context is one way for agencies to act as data
192. For example, the FTC uses data from its nonpublic Sentinel database to
look for patterns of complaints against a potential enforcement target. See
CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 55–56. For a series of posts on the use of automated
decision-making by regulatory agencies, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
Artificial Intelligence and the Administrative State, REG. REVIEW (Dec. 19–22,
2016),
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/12/19/artificial-intelligence-and-theadministrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/WS9U-USFN].
193. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the
Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON
THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 134 (Nicholas R. Parrilo ed., 2017).
194. See id.; see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (investigating
algorithms in the private sector); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY (2016) (questioning the objectivity of algorithms and machinelearning tools).
195. See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 104 (citing reports and concerns
that federal spending databases, like USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov, provide
voluminous data on spending, but do not provide criteria or justifications for those
spending decisions and whether they square with congressional directives).
196. Id. at 104–05 (noting that these are two real-life examples in
USAspending.gov).
197. Id. at 105.
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“stewards,” rather than to serve as mere publishers or
repositories.
Scholars also note that agencies exercise significant
discretion to decide what data to disclose and the scope of that
data, which can skew user perceptions.198 Industry repeatedly
made such arguments as the CFPB built its Consumer
Complaint Database. Commenters objected that the database
would necessarily include only self-selected complaints that
were nonrandom and thus not representative of the consumer
population.199 Industry commenters also objected that the
complaints lacked context and that users might overlook the
data’s limitations, despite disclaimers by the Bureau.200
Another problem with agency disclosure is the volume of it,
ironically, and the risk of drowning the public with
information. Data.gov currently hosts over 195,000 data
sets,201 some of which include millions of records or data points.
But
more
information
is
not
always
better
informationalthough many disclosure regimes assume
otherwise.202 Today, federal agencies post so much information
online that many scholars wonder who is served by these data
dumps.203 The conventional wisdom is that few benefit from an
“undifferentiated mass of information” posted online, as the
“cost of sifting through it would overwhelm its value.”204
Genuinely useful information is often buried.205 As Paredes
notes, sunlight can be the best disinfectant, “[b]ut sunlight can
also be blinding.”206
So how does salient information stand out? Evaluations of
mandatory disclosures regimes find that even the most wellknown are ignored: “Next to the warning label on cigarette
packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official
advice in our society.”207 Gradually, because mandated
198. Id. at 117.
199. See, e.g., Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,558, 37,561 (June 22, 2012).
200. See id. at 37,562.
201. DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) [https:// perma.
cc/E3N3-NPSG] .
202. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 650.
203. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 118.
204. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1832.
205. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 737.
206. Paredes, supra note 10, at 419.
207. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1012–13 (quoting Patrick Malone, “You Have the
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disclosures are so attractive to policymakers, they tend to
accumulate over time, which only compounds the
problem“disclosures are added, never removed.”208 As BenShahar and Schneider observe, consumers “encounter too many
disclosures to digest most of them.”209 Such concerns lend
credence to the idea that sophisticated intermediaries will
continue to serve a valuable channeling and interpretive role.
Indeed, the idea behind the massive data dumps on Data.gov
and other federal databases “is that nongovernmental
intermediaries can step in and translate the raw data for the
general public.”210
A related shortcoming of disclosure is the complexity of the
data. Mandated disclosure regimes have become ubiquitous in
federal and state law, ensconced in statutes, ordinances,
agency regulations, and common law.211 Sometimes, these
sources of law demand “marvelously elaborate disclosures” that
are difficult if not impossible for the intended beneficiaries
(usually consumers) to understand.212 Consumers, of course,
are not perfectly rational, but exercise “bounded rationality”
due to various cognitive biases and distortions.213 Thus, many
scholars have come to recognize that disclosure of objective
information
may
not,
in
itself,
generate
optimal
outcomesrather, disclosure regimes “may need to aggregate,
translate, simplify, or benchmark the facts.”214 Even if users do
not understand the science or statistical techniques behind the
data, the data may still be successful in improving the product
or conduct targeted by the disclosure.215
Given the volume and complexity of most data, intended
beneficiaries often do not and cannot use it, particularly in the

Right to Remain Silent”: Miranda After Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 368
(1986)); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 678.
208. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 679.
209. Id. at 705.
210. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 118.
211. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 650.
212. Id.
213. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 33. This is in contrast to the perfectly
rational “economic man” famously described by Herbert Simon, which he
recognized is an ideal rather than a reality. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955). See generally HERBERT A.
SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1982).
214. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 34.
215. Craswell, supra note 18, at 361.
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idealized way policymakers intend. In a variety of legal
contexts, the targets for information disclosure “often do not
read disclosed information, do not understand it when they
read it, and do not use it even if they understand it.”216
Examples abound. A troubling one is the extensive campus
crime data reported by colleges and universities to the
Department of Education under the Clery Act,217 which often
goes unread.218 Nevertheless, the Department promises that
the Clery Act “is intended to provide students and their
families, as higher education consumers, with accurate,
complete, and timely information about safety on campus so
that they can make informed decisions.”219 The current reality
is that, for most databases, such aspirations outstrip reality.
Databases and other disclosure regimes can also be costly.
Disclosure is often assumed to be simple and low-cost,
particularly compared to more conventional regulation and
enforcement.220 But successful disclosure systems often require
“a distinctive and demanding architecture.”221 Any thoughtful
disclosure regime must determine what information must be
disclosed, by whom, to whom, the optimal format, and
appropriate quality assurance and enforcement mechanisms.222
Indeed, many assume that disclosure avoids many of the
compliance and enforcement costs that attend to traditional
command-and-control regulation.223 But, compliance with
disclosure
regimes
must
also
be
monitored
and
enforcedfrequently with both civil and criminal penalties.224
For regimes with low rates of compliance, policymakers have
often increased both penalties and enforcement efforts.225

216. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 665.
217. Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics
(Clery) Act, Pub. L. No. 101–542, 104 Stat. 2385 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1092(f)).
218. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 702–04; Sara Lipka, Do Crime
Statistics Keep Students Safe?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 2009, at A1.
219. OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK
FOR CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING 3 (2005); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17,
at 702–03.
220. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 735–37.
221. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 39.
222. Id. at 39–46.
223. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 735–37.
224. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 45 (examining civil and criminal penalties
to enforce the disclosure mandates in campaign finance law and corporate law).
225. Id. at 45–46.
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Moreover, the cost to disclosers can be significant. For
example, a single new SEC requirement that companies file
“current reports” of insider transactions was expected to
generate 215,000 additional filings to the SEC annually, at an
estimated cost of over $89 million per year.226 Another recent
study found that U.S. physicians in just four common
specialties spend $15.4 billion annually reporting under
various quality measurement programs.227 Thus, regulation by
disclosure can be costly.
Opportunity costs can also be significant. Relying on
disclosure as a means to pursue regulatory ends may mean
bypassing other, better means for achieving those ends.228
Traditional command-and-control regulation long ago lost its
luster among policymakers and academics.229 But modern
replacements like “new governance,” despite their many
promises, can underwhelm. Despite the widespread use of
disclosure, “it remains an open question whether transparency
as regulation is better or worse, all things considered, than
more direct forms of regulation.”230 One might reasonably
wonder whether the time and personnel that agencies spend on
disclosure would be better spent writing regulations and
enforcing them.
Finally, there is some evidence that mandatory disclosure
regimes can backfire. Consumers might be tempted to let their
guards down when presented with mandated disclosures that
give transactions a “veneer of legality.”231 There is also

226. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg.
19,914 (proposed Apr. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 230, 239, 249).
227. Lawrence B. Casalino et al., U.S. Physician Practices Spend More Than
$15.4 Billion Annually to Report Quality Measures, 35 HEALTH AFF. 401 (Mar.
2016). Of course, for perspective, annual U.S. health spending is roughly $3.2
trillion. Historical, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.
gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/national
healthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html (last visited July 14,
2017) [http://perma.cc/B5YW-ZZAJ].
228. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 737–42.
229. Disclosure also responds to the Hayekian criticism that command-andcontrol regulation is insufficient for regulating a large, complex society. F.A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524–25 (1945).
230. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1348.
231. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 740 (citing Lauren E. Willis,
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending:
Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 794–95 (2006) (using as an example the many
disclosures required in consumer loans, which give a “veneer of legality and
authority to the loan process”)).
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evidence that the party required to disclose information often
interprets their compliance with the disclosure requirement as
granting them license to act more harshly.232 Although there is
much more research to be done, again, the virtues of disclosure
are no longer uncontested.
IV. AGENCY DATABASES
Nascent skepticism with the use of disclosure as a
regulatory tool has not stopped disclosure efforts from
proliferating. Today, thousands of federal agency websites host
hundreds of thousands of agency databases (as of February
2017, over 195,000).233 As such, writing about government data
is difficult because databases have become so very common.234
A comprehensive survey of agency databases would “pointlessly
burden” the audience, risking the same information overload
often imposed by policymakers that rely on disclosure.235
Nevertheless, as becomes quickly obvious,236 agency databases
are becoming the norm rather than the exception.
Below I survey six of the most salient agency efforts to post
searchable data sets online. Of course, there are many more
worth discussiontoo many for a single article. The following
represents a cross-section of databases that try to achieve
regulatory goals, using online disclosure of behavior to try to
affect that behavior.
A.

The FEC’s Campaign Finance Data

For decades, federal campaign finance law has relied on
disclosure not only to police limits on campaign contributions
and spending, but also to pursue deeper goals of deterring

232. Id. at 739 (citing such evidence related to conflict-of-interest disclosures).
233. DATA.GOV, supra note 201 (“Search over 194,126 data sets” as of March
22, 2016). Note that as of April 1, 2016, 158,301 data sets were published by the
federal government, with the rest published by sub-federal units of government,
including a smattering from the private and nonprofit sectors. Data Catalog:
Organization Types, DATA.GOV, http://catalog.data.gov/dataset#sec-organization_
type (last visited July 14, 1017) [http://perma.cc/L5SY-5M9S] (See “Organization
Types” in the left sidebar).
234. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 652.
235. Id.
236. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at app. E.
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corruption and the appearance of it.237 Indeed, disclosure has
been, perhaps, the one leg of the campaign finance law tripod
to be spared by the Supreme Court.238 Unlike limits on
campaign
contributions
and
expenditures,
disclosure
requirements have endured repeated First Amendment
challengesfrom early cases like Burroughs239 to more strident
recent cases like Citizens United and McCutcheon.240 Of course,
in the seminal case Buckley v. Valeo,241 the Court upheld
various disclosure requirements introduced in the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and the FECA
Amendments of 1974.242 In the ensuing decades, as courts
invalidated various restrictions on campaign contributions and
expenditures on First Amendment grounds, disclosure
requirements endured. Thus, through attrition, disclosure has
become the preferred choice for regulating money in politics.243
Indeed, recent reform proposals would address lingering
problems with campaign finance regulation by using even more
disclosures, for example, by trying to triangulate FEC data
with data from other agencies like the SEC and IRS.244
Today, the FEC maintains several searchable online
databases on its website, which are centralized on the FEC’s
Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal.245 Users can search FEC
data based on reports required of federal candidates, parties,
237. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976).
238. The other two legs being limits on campaign contributions and limits on
expenditures.
239. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (upholding an indictment
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act).
240. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010);
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442, 1459–60 (2014).
241. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68.
242. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3 (1972), amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431).
243. See Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass Darkly: The
Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1445
(2014); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 572 (2012).
244. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on
Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 931, 935–36 (2013).
245. Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/pindex.shtml (last visited July 14, 2017) [http://perma.cc/V7V5Q4MR] [hereinafter FEC]. The FEC is currently transitioning to a new website.
See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC introduces retooled, streamlined,
user-centered website (May 30, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-introducesretooled-streamlined-user-centered-website/ [https://perma.cc/U8N8-ADXZ].
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committees, donors, and lobbyists, among others.246 The data
are generally searchable by name, date, and location,247 and
are presented in list, map, and chart form,248 making them
more accessible to lay users. Thus, for example, a user can
learn how much money a federal candidate in her district has
raised and spent, or how much a certain political action
committee (PAC) has dedicated to electioneering, or find
detailed information about independent expenditures or
bundled contributions.249 The FEC’s Disclosure Data Catalog
publishes these datasets in downloadable .CSV, .XML, or .XSD
formats,250 thus making them more useful for sophisticated
users.
Despite their broad scope, FEC databases pay special
attention, of course, to the activities of candidates and
committees. Users can search for federal candidates and
political committees by name and view on a single page all
reports filed by that person or committee, including a multiyear summary of the money they raised and spent.251
Like many other agencies, the FEC also publishes online
searchable databases of enforcement records. Its Enforcement
Query System is a searchable depository of FEC enforcement
documents, including complaints, responses, settlements, and
other relevant documents.252 The system includes, for example,
a searchable and sortable list of parties required to pay

246. Campaign Finance Reports and Data, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/ (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5BB9FH3X].
247. Searchable Presentations, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/
portal/searchable.shtml (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/T6TNRGYN].
248. See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Campaign Finance, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/DL4N-VCUF].
249. Disclosure Data Catalog, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/
data/DataCatalog.do?cf=searchable (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
V6FV-KMME].
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Financial Summary for Ted Cruz, Full Cycle: 2013-18, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/candidate/S2TX00312/ (last visited
Aug. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3XAK-86X2].
252. Enforcement Query System (EQS), FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqs/searcheqs (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/96GTFPQY].
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administrative fines for violating reporting requirements.253
Users can view the name of the party fined, the type of report
filed late (or not at all), the amount of the fine, and any related
candidate information.254
Congress has recognized that data held by the FEC can be
more meaningful when combined with data held by other
institutions, including Congress itself. For example, the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires “lobbyists” to register
with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate
and disclose their lobbying activities, including who they
lobbied and on what issues, bills, or other government
action.255 The Act requires House and Senate officials to use
“computerized systems” with “coding” and “cross-indexing” to
“maximize public access to materials filed.”256 Congress also
requires these reports to be available over the internet.257 In
2007, frustrated with the slow rate of publication online,
Congress amended the law to require publication online in a
searchable, sortable, and downloadable format.258 The 2007
amendments also linked lobbying information with campaign
contribution data reported to the FEC,259 so that users can
better track financial ties between lobbyists and public
officials. Thus, the amendments demonstrate how data regimes
can be dynamic rather than static.
But, as with many other disclosure-based regulatory
schemes, researchers question how effectively campaign
finance disclosures have achieved their stated goals of
preventing corruption and the appearance of it.260 Despite
253. Administrative Fines, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/data/
AdminFine.do?format=html (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EB8SVY5D].
254. Id.
255. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
256. Id. § 1605.
257. Id. § 1605(a)(4),(9).
258. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81,
§ 103(b), 121 Stat. 735, 739; see also Lobbying Disclosure, OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
U.S. HOUSE OF REP., http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov (last visited July 22,
2017) [https://perma.cc/2ZUH-7R8J]; Query the Lobbying Disclosure Act Database,
U.S. SENATE, http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=selectFields&reset=1
(last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YR6C-GC3P].
259. Honest Leadership & Open Government Act, §§ 203, 204, Pub. L. No. 11081, 121 Stat. 735, 742-46 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1604(d), 434(i)).
260. Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243. Larry Lessig’s work is particularly
skeptical of FEC disclosures. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESSAND A PLAN TO STOP IT 251–60 (2011).
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relatively thoughtful presentation and formatting of the data,
the data themselves are not very reliable. Compliance with
FEC reporting requirements is spotty, filings are often
selective and incomplete (the FEC does not require filings to be
complete to be accepted), FEC enforcement is limited in several
important ways, data collection is not always standardized, and
thus the data is often unreliable.261 To note just one example,
although the FEC tracks campaign contributions, it does not
track individual contributors well because there is no unique
identifier assigned to them.262 Thus, the data “gives the illusion
of transparency, but functions instead to obscure the most
pertinent financial constituencies in a sea of data.”263 These
design failures mean that the intended usersvoters,
intermediaries, and regulatorsare relying on flawed data,
even if it is presented in multiple formats.264
Moreover, scholars have questioned at length whether
voluminous campaign finance data succeeds in achieving its
stated goals and have identified a long list of preconditions
necessary for the data to do so. For example, Malbin and Gais
identify several requirements that align with the wisdom
applied to other disclosure-based regimesthe disclosure must
be accurate, usable, and accessible, both to the intermediaries
who can synthesize it, and to voters who might cast votes based
on it.265 The preconditions are substantially similar to the
conditions prescribed by Fung, Graham, and Weil (which I
discuss in more detail in Part V, infra).266 Numerous articles by
campaign finance scholars suggest specific improvements to
the FEC’s data practices, including how it collects, processes,
and disseminates data, and enforces compliance.267 Simple
fixes, like assigning unique identifiers to contributors and

Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243, at 1479–85.
Id. at 1484.
Id.
Id. at 1486–89.
MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:
SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 36 (1998).
266. Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243, at 1475 (citing FUNG ET AL., supra note
15, at 11).
267. For just a small sampling, see, e.g., Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243;
Hasen, supra note 243; Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of
Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683 (2012).
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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allowing the FEC to conduct random audits, might greatly
improve the quality of the data.268
Finally, as with other data regimes, third-party
intermediaries play an important role in translating and
synthesizing the government’s campaign finance data. Groups
like the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), the Campaign
Finance Institute (CFI), and the Sunlight Foundation rely on
FEC data to provide more digestible information to the
public.269 Indeed, an old 2002 survey found that political
journalists relied on the CRP website more than any other,
with the FEC’s own site ranking third.270 Another group called
MAPlight.org mashes up the publicly available voting records
of members of Congress with campaign finance data, trying to
find correlations.271 MapLight gathers data from not only the
FEC, but also from the CRP, which runs OpenSecrets.org and
FollowTheMoney.org (for California data).272 However, because
the FEC data is so flawed, scholars worry that it is not suitable
for use by researchers and other informational intermediaries
who might otherwise be able to extrapolate larger patterns or
trends.273 Thus, the FEC’s regime is characterized by noble
sentiments but flawed data.
Therefore, although there is low confidence in the FEC’s
data sets, there remains clear demand for such data and
somewhat feasible fixes that are likely to appeal to many
interested parties, such as voters, watchdogs, and the
disclosers themselves. Improved data qualityusing the
methods recommended in Part V and the recommendations of
earlier projectsshould enable better, more frequent uses of
the information and perhaps even affect disclosers’ behavior.

Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243, at 1494–99.
Id. at 1487–88.
Id. (citing ALBERT L. MAY, INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, & THE
INTERNET, THE VIRTUAL TRAIL: POLITICAL JOURNALISM ON THE INTERNET 22
(2002), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
reports/the_practice_of_journalism/pponlinejournalistpdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3X2-M8JK]).
271. MAPLIGHT, http://www.maplight.org (last visited July 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/5EFN-MCCA].
272. Find Contributions, MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-congress/contri
butions (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7T2W-8S8Z].
273. Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243, at 1490.
268.
269.
270.
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The EPA’s Toxic Release Data

Like campaign finance law, environmental law relies on
public
disclosure
to
regulate
underlying
conduct.
Environmental scholars sometimes refer to this as “regulation
by revelation”leveraging the threat of public backlash to
change the underlying behavior that leads to pollution.274 As
the EPA’s former General Counsel observed, “[i]nformation . . .
can be a supplement, sometimes even an alternative, to
regulation. When broadly available, information can change
behavior.”275
This logic undergirds several well-known environmental
statutes that are predicated on disclosure, such as the Clean
Air Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act; the National Environmental Policy Act; the Safe Drinking
Water Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act.276 The
commonality is that these statutes all “place affirmative duties
on federal agencies to make information available to the
public.”277 In combination, these laws “seem to provide a right
of public access to virtually all environmental information in
the hands of the federal government.”278
In fact, perhaps the most well-known agency database
dates back to 1986, when Congress passed the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, requiring the
EPA to establish a national toxic chemical inventory, with the
information “in a computer data base . . . accessible to any
person.”279 The database became the Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) program.
The TRI program requires facilities to report their
production and release of roughly 650 dangerous chemicals.280

274. Esty, supra note 4, at 126; ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW
RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW WORLD 188–90 (2003); William F. Pederson,
Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 160–61(2001).
275. Frank S. Arnold, Reduced Health a Regulatory Cost?, 15 ENVIRO. F. 36
(July/Aug. 1998).
276. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1788 (citations omitted).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99499, § 313 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11023(h), (j)).
280. 30 C.F.R. § 372.65 (2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
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The EPA first reported TRI data in 1989, and first published it
online in 1998.281 Today’s version allows users to search for
toxic release data by state, county, city, or ZIP code, and will
generate a customized “factsheet” based on the query, listing
all facilities in the geographic area and the quantity of
chemicals they release.282 The data are presented in colorful
chart, graph, and map forms.283 For each reporting facility, the
EPA maintains a “Facility Profile Report” with more granular
data regarding the amount of chemicals managed, released, or
transferred.284 Still more data is available by link to each
company’s full reports in the EPA’s Envirofacts database.285
TRI has been widely hailed for having a “significant
impact on firm-level emissions” and even inspiring several
other disclosure-based regulatory efforts, both in the United
States and overseas.286 The initial success of the TRI program
even surprised the EPA and environmental groups who had
toiled for years to regulate toxic pollution.287 Ten years after
initiating the TRI program, the amount of pollution released
had dropped by half.288 In fact, initial media interest in the
program and the resulting threat of negative publicity
appeared to have a powerful impact on companieseven before
the first reports were required, executives of some companies
promised to reduce their toxic outputs by as much as 90
percent.289 As one of the earliest programs of its kind, the TRI

281. TRI Program Milestones, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/documents/tritimeline_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZJ9-849B].
282. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program (last visited July 22,
2017) [https://perma.cc/Y23G-LD3T].
283. See, e.g., 2014 TRI Factsheet: City – Dallas, TX, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://iaspub.epa.gov/triexplorer/tri_factsheet.factsheet?&pstate=TX&pcity=Dall
as&pyear=2014&pDataSet=TRIQ1 (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/9HRC-WBPK].
284. See, e.g., Facility Profile Report, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://iaspub.
epa.gov/triexplorer/release_fac_profile?TRILIB=TRIQ1&FLD=&FLD=RELLBY&F
LD=TSFDSP&OFFDISPD=&OTHDISPD=&ONDISPD=&OTHOFFD=&tri=75209
TXSNS6000L&YEAR=2014 (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YH975AJE].
285. Envirofacts, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/enviro/index.
html (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GF6N-8H6C].
286. Mark A. Cohen & W. Kip Viscusi, The Role of Information Disclosure in
Climate Mitigation Policy, 3 CLIMATE CHANGE ECO. 1250020-1–2 (2012).
287. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 29.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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has been applauded by many as the best example of regulation
via disclosure.290
Perhaps inspired by its own success, the EPA now
publishes hundreds of datasets online. The EPA website
publishes so many datasets that it includes several landing
pages that help users search for and navigate the data
available.291 Some of the more well-known datasets after TRI
include the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online
(ECHO) website, which allows users to search for recent and
historical enforcement actions, including the last date of
inspection.292 The EPA currently lists ninety-six datasets on its
website,293 with 1,738 listed on Data.gov.294 The agency even
hosts an online discussion forum for data developers.295
Despite the initial success of TRI, Fung, Graham, and Weil
found that in comparison with seven other disclosure regimes,
toxic release disclosure was only moderately successful, at
best.296 They found, in particular, that toxic release data is not
embedded in potential users’ decision-making, as “[m]ost home
buyers, renters, job seekers, consumers, and investors do not
consider toxic pollution” when making decisions.297 The TRI
data did succeed in better informing policymakers, such as
Congress and the EPA itself.298 And many manufacturers
quickly embedded the new data into their decision-making,
recognizing the reputational and regulatory consequences.299

290. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 4; Pederson, supra note 274.
291. See, e.g., Environmental Dataset Gateway (EDG), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://edg.epa.gov/metadata/catalog/main/home.page (last visited July 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/5K28-9YM3]; Envirofacts, supra note 285; Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Data Finder, EPA.GOV, https://iaspub.epa.gov/enviro/datafinder.agency (last
visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XPU4-7MF9].
292. Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO), ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://echo.epa.gov (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9YZ685CX].
293. Developer Central: Data, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://developer.epa.gov
/category/data/ (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma. cc/4HTQ-5KJ8].
294. EPA Data Catalog, DATA.GOV, http://catalog.data.gov/dataset?organizati
on=epa-gov&_organization_limit=0 (last visited on Mar. 11, 2016) [https://
perma.cc/6KJD-USKE].
295. Data and Developer Forum, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://blog.epa.gov/
data/ (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UK3C-WJPQ]. The forum does
not appear to be particularly active.
296. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 76, 79.
297. Id. at 85.
298. Id. at 86.
299. Id.
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But researchers have gradually curbed their enthusiasm based
on studies showing flaws in reporting (including inaccurate
data) and longitudinal studies showing less impact on potential
users’ and disclosers’ actual conduct.300 Scholars have long
worried that EPA datasets are “patchy” and “unreliable.”301
In the last decade, despite its success, the EPA has
“drastically scaled back the information made public” under the
TRI program.302 Prior to 2006, the EPA required facilities to
report information regarding any chemical release over 500
pounds.303 But a 2006 rule increased the threshold to 5,000
pounds, provided the total annual release into the environment
does not exceed 2,000 pounds.304 The GAO criticized the EPA’s
rule as reducing the “quantity and detail of information”
released to communities.305 Under the Trump administration,
one can envision even more drastic changes to the TRI
program.
But these stories have not deterred scholars and
policymakers who still believe that data is the path to
environmental regulation. For example, Daniel Esty argues
that “[a]s data become easier to analyze and disseminate, and
dramatically less costly to acquire and use, our capacity to
identify and solve environmental problems will increase
substantially.”306 Indeed, he predicts that information
technologies will enable an “environmental revolution perhaps
as important as that which launched the modern
environmental movement” in the 1960s.307
Of course, even data optimists believe that there are
significant challenges in producing environmental data that
are reliable and usable.308 But, as in other fields,
environmental scholars see great promise in third-party
watchdogs and data intermediaries translating voluminous
300. Id. (citing studies).
301. Esty, supra note 4, at 156.
302. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1791.
303. Toxics Release Inventory Burden Reduction Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg.
76,932, 76,933 (Dec. 22, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372).
304. Id. at 76,937.
305. JOHN B. STEPHENSON, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT-TO-KNOW: EPA’S RECENT RULE COULD REDUCE
AVAILABILITY OF TOXIC CHEMICAL INFORMATION USED TO ASSESS
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 16 (2007); Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1791 n.33.
306. Esty, supra note 4, at 119.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 171–74.
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data into usable heuristics for consumers, perhaps creating a
race to the top among regulated firms.309 Nevertheless, not
even the most well-resourced and well-meaning intermediaries
can cure flawed data. The EPA’s many data sets, then, suffer
more for quality than for quantity.
C.

The CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Data

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is the
newest agency among those surveyed here, and its newness
makes it interesting. Born of the 2008 financial crisis, the
Bureau was “designed in a world of new technology.”310 In
short, the CFPB “is a new agency operating under a new
statute and is on the frontier of the open data trend.”311 The
Bureau’s Office of Consumer Response operates a process for
consumers to file complaints regarding financial products and
services, which quite notably are published online by the CFPB
in a massive, searchable Consumer Complaint Database,
identifying companies by name.312
The CFPB website allows consumers to file complaints for
eleven categories of financial products, including mortgages,
student loans, and credit cards.313 Complaints can specify the
name of the company, the type of product or service at issue,
the type of problem with it, and the consumer’s ZIP code, all of
which the Bureau authenticates and sends to the company for
a response.314 The published data is searchable and sortable,

309. Id. at 208–09.
310. Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s
Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 86 (2012).
311. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 62 (quotation marks omitted). The Bureau
was created by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The idea for the CFPB germinated, of course,
from a 2007 essay by then-professor Elizabeth Warren. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe
at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/
5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/SX8N-6G3X].
312. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited July 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Q48G-ZRHZ] [hereinafter Consumer Complaint Database].
313. Id. The database initially posted complaints only for credit cards. See
Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628 (Dec. 8,
2011). In 2012, the Bureau broadened the database to include other products and
services regulated by the Bureau. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77
Fed. Reg. 37,616 (June 22, 2012).
314. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,616–17.
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and includes not only the company’s name, but also its
response (if any) and whether the response was timely or
further disputed by the customer.315 Companies select their
responses via a pull down menu that includes options such as
“Closed with monetary relief,” “Closed with non-monetary
relief,” “Incorrect company,” and “In progress.”316 Companies
have a total of sixty days to respond, and late responses are
tagged by the CFPB as “Past due” or “No response” if the delay
exceeds thirty days.317 Each complaint and response is
published, but only if it meets numerous publication criteria.318
In 2014, the Bureau expanded the database (reversing its
previous position) by posting narrative commentary by
consumers.319 It originally declined to do so, citing privacy and
the risk of disclosing consumers’ personal information.320 But
after considering industry objections (including the potential
harm to company reputations) and devising ways to scrub the
information of personally identifiable information, the Bureau
finalized its plan to include consumer narratives in the
Complaint Database.321 As a measure of symmetry, the Bureau
proposed to allow companies to post their own narrative
responses,322 but companies preferred to respond with a preset
list of “structured” responses, such as “Company acted
appropriately,” “Factual dispute,” “Misunderstanding,” and
“Opportunity for improvement.”323 However, these responses

315. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 62–63.
316. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL (V. 2.14) 2–3
(2015), http://www.cfjblaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Resources/cfpb-companyportal-manual-may-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MRX-TYBR]
[hereinafter
COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL].
317. Id. at 24.
318. The Bureau will not publish complaints if they are missing critical
information, have been referred to other regulators, are duplicative, would reveal
trade secrets, are fraudulent, or identify the wrong company. Id. at 26; Final
Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,218,
21,225 (Apr. 10, 2013).
319. See Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, Notice of Proposed
Policy Statement with Request for Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,765 (July 23,
2014).
320. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,568.
321. See Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative
Data, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,572 (Mar. 24, 2015).
322. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, Notice of Proposed
Policy Statement with Request for Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. at 42,768.
323. COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL, supra note 316, at 29.
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are optional; companies need not select one for publication.324
Today, then, the Complaint Database includes narrative
descriptions of consumers’ problems (if they choose to narrate
them), which can make the problems more concrete and
compelling than displaying relatively sanitized data entries
alone.325
The intended users of the Complaint Database are
consumers, researchers, the Bureau, other regulators, and even
the subjects of the complaints themselvescompanies.326 The
Bureau and consumer groups emphasize that the primary
intended beneficiaries are consumers, and publishing
complaint data is a “public service” that can “empower”
consumers and help them avoid “bad actors” in these
markets.327 The Bureau itself emphasizes that “disclosure is
one of the best tools government agencies can use.”328 Former
Bureau Director Richard Cordray encouraged “the public,
including consumers, the companies that serve them, analysts,
data scientists, civic hackers, developers, policymakers,
journalists, and academics, to analyze, augment, and build on
the public database.”329 Bureau staff also hope that
intermediaries develop mobile apps and other information
products based on complaint data.330
This latter aspirationthat intermediaries will use the
government’s datais being realized, at least modestly so far.
Academics are publishing empirical analyses of the CFPB’s
data.331 Public interest research groups (PIRGs) are producing
reports of certain financial product categories, like credit cards

324. Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative
Data, 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,583.
325. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 65.
326. Id.; Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg.
76,628, 76,630–31 (Dec. 8, 2011).
327. Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed.
Reg. 21,220 (Apr. 10, 2013).
328. Id. at 21,220.
329. Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared
Remarks of Director Richard Cordray at the Consumer Response Field (Mar. 28,
2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-of-directorrichard-cordray-at-the-consumer-response-field-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/J8LF5S7R].
330. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 66.
331. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of
the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343 (2014).
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and debt collection, based on Bureau data.332 In 2015, the
rankings-crazed U.S. News & World Report ranked credit cards
by relying, in part, on data from the Consumer Complaint
Database.333
Similar to other agencies, the CFPB hopes that the act of
data publication itself will encourage companies to improve
their underlying behavior.334 Bureau staff report that
complaints have inspired some companies to address potential
problems of their own, such as long customer service phone
trees.335 Indeed, one of the Bureau’s original aspirations was
that published complaints would encourage companies to
compete in a race to the top, based on how they handled
customer service and customer complaints.336 Management
consulting firms now advise companies to “turn what they hear
from the CFPB’s consumer complaint database into a business
advantage.”337 Bureau staff also report that some companies
have tied executive compensation to how well the company has
responded to published complaints.338 In short, the Bureau sees
its role somewhat modestly as a publisherproviding a
window into a dialogue between companies and their
customers.339 Once complaints are published, “[t]he
marketplace of ideas then does the rest.”340
Of course, the Consumer Complaint Database has not been
without controversy, particularly to the firms identified in it.
Firms and industry groups filed scores of public comments
objecting to Bureau proposals to publish complaint data. The
objections fall into seven general categories: (i) it is unfair to
332. See, e.g., Reports: The CFPB Gets Results for Consumers, U.S. PUB. INT.
RESEARCH GRP. (PIRG), http://www.uspirg.org/page/usf/reports-cfpb-gets-result sconsumers (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4L5L-EHT6].
333. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., U.S. News & World Report Releases the Best
Credit Card Rankings, (Nov. 10, 2015, 11:21 AM), https://www.usnews.com/
info/blogs/press-room/2015/11/10/us-news-releases-the-best-credit-card-rankings
[https://perma.cc/2Q2E-W5ZP].
334. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 66.
335. Id.
336. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628,
76,630 (Dec. 8, 2011).
337. Analysis: CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database: Deloitte’s Analysis
Reveals Valuable Insights, DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financ
ial-services/articles/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-cfpb-consumercomplaint-database.html (last visited July 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/63V7-S752].
338. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 66.
339. Id. at 66–67.
340. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76,631.
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publish complaints that are not verified by the Bureau; (ii) the
complaints are self-selecting and thus are non-random and
non-representative of customer experiences; (iii) the data lack
context and might appear to be endorsed by the Bureau; (iv)
the data are susceptible to manipulation and fraud; (v) the
companies will suffer reputational harm in the media and
might draw the attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers; (vi) the
database is overinclusive because it includes complaints that
are not necessarily legal or regulatory violations; and (vii) the
Bureau lacks statutory authority to publish complaint data
online.341 The Bureau responded at length to these objections
in the Federal Register, showing a basic sensitivity to industry
concerns, though disagreeing with industry conclusions that
the Bureau should not publish the data online.342
Moreover, the Bureau has fielded industry complaints
about the database in several formats, including in public
comments filed during notice and comment periods, in letters
to the Director, and in complaints to the Bureau’s
Ombudsman.343 The Federal Reserve’s Office of Inspector
General, which has oversight responsibility for the CFPB, has
audited the database “to assess the effectiveness of the
[CFPB’s] controls over the accuracy and completeness of its
public-facing Consumer Complaint Database.”344 Still, the
database remains a target for industry, and a bill proposed in
the 115th Congress would remove it from the public domain,345
sparking an outcry from consumer watchdogs and public
interest groups.346
Thus, as a new database being run by a new agency, the
Consumer Complaint Database continues to be refined and
new uses (and objections) continue to emerge. Although the
database seems well-designed to defuse potential criticisms, it

CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 67–70.
Id. at 67–71.
Id. at 75.
FED. RESERVE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 2015-FMIC-C-016,
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENHANCE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OVER THE CFPB’S
CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATABASE, AUDIT REPORT 1 (2015).
345. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 725 (2017–18).
H.R. 10 passed the House on June 8, 2017.
346. See, e.g., Ed Mierzwinski, Financial Choice Act: A Cruel Choice for the
CFPB & Consumers, U.S. PIRG (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.uspirg.org/blogs/edsblog/usp/financial-choice-act-cruel-choice-cfpb-consumers [https://perma.cc/8J75GX73].
341.
342.
343.
344.
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is still susceptible to being undermined by an unsympathetic
Trump administration and a Republican-led Congress, per the
pending bill.347 Nevertheless, the CFPB’s efforts can serve as a
model for other agencies considering publishing consumer
reports or complaints.348
D.

The CPSC’s Product Safety Data

The Consumer Product Safety Commission’s database,
SaferProducts.gov, enjoys more clear statutory authority and
attention from Congress than most agency databases. Since the
1970s, Congress has required the CPSC to “protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury” and “assist consumers in
evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products.”349
But in 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act, requiring the Commission to create a
searchable online database of product safety incidents.350 The
law required the database to include “reports of harm relating
to the use of consumer products,” including reports from
consumers, physicians, state and local governments, and
others.351 Each report must describe the product or substance
at issue, identify the manufacturer or labeler, and describe the
harm reported.352 Supporters hailed the effort to “empower
consumers,” “expedite recall disclosure,” and “enhance a
family’s right to know about dangerous and defective products
on the market.”353 The CPSC launched SaferProducts.gov in
March 2011.354
Today, SaferProducts.gov includes a searchable online
database of thousands of “reports of harm” related to identified

347. H.R. 10.
348. See, e.g., ACUS, Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259 (June
21, 2016).
349. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b) (2012).
350. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), Pub. L. No.
110-314, § 212, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2055a).
351. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(b)(1)(A) (2012).
352. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(b)(2)(B). U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) regulations provide more detail. 16 C.F.R. § 1102.10(d) (2011).
353. 154 CONG. REC. 7577-01 (2008) (statement by Rep. Eshoo); 1645-01 (2008)
(statement by Rep. Delauro); 7577-01 (2008) (statement by Rep. Hollen).
354. CPSC published the final rule in 2010. Publicly Available Consumer
Product Safety Information Database, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,832 (Dec. 9, 2010) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1102).
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products.355 Like the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database,
the site has a portal for users to report incidents and a portal
for companies to respond to them.356 The database is keywordsearchable with advanced search options that include product
name, company or brand name, and the product model.357 The
advanced search also allows users to search for incidents by
date, location, the “Victim’s Age,” and by “Injury Information,”
including reports of death.358
Interestingly, the Act also requires the CPSC to “provide
clear and conspicuous notice to users of the database that the
Commission does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or
adequacy of the contents of the database.”359 As such,
SaferProducts.gov includes a disclaimer that tracks this
language almost verbatim.360
An innovation in SaferProducts.gov that might be
emulated by other agency databases361 is that the CPSC allows
manufacturers to comment on reports and object to
inaccuracies. This feature derives from the Act itself, which
dictates that the CPSC “shall” provide manufacturers and
labelers an opportunity to comment on incident reports and
request that such comments be included in the report posted

355. An accounting on July 25, 2013, found 15,517 reports on
SaferProducts.gov (roughly 18 months after the site went live on March 11, 2011).
See The Consumer Product Incident Database — Saferproducts.gov, COALITION
FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.sensiblesafeguards.org/fact
sheets/the-consumer-product-incident-database/ [https://perma.cc/V2UP-Q4WJ].
356. The site includes “portals” for both consumers and businesses. See, e.g.,
U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, File a Report, SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV,
https://www.saferproducts.gov/CPSRMSPublic/Incidents/ReportIncident.aspx (last
visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z4ZE-RJBZ]; U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n, Business Portal, SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV, https://www.saferproducts.gov/
CPSRMSPublic/Industry/Home.aspx (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.
cc/T3T7-XFZE].
Advanced
Search,
357. U.S.
Consumer
Prod.
Safety
Comm’n,
SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV, http://www.saferproducts.gov/Search/AdvancedSearch.aspx
(last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2Q2K-V379].
358. Id.
359. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(b)(5) (2012).
360. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Home Page, SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV,
http://www.saferproducts.gov/Default.aspx (last visited July 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Y784-6L4N] (“CPSC does not guarantee the accuracy,
completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the Publicly Available Consumer
Product Safety Information Database on SaferProducts.gov, particularly with
respect to information submitted by people outside of CPSC.”).
361. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 20–21.
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online.362 Likewise, the CPSC must consider objections that
any information in a report is “materially inaccurate,”363 which
the CPSC defines as information “that is false or misleading,
and which is so substantial and important as to affect a
reasonable consumer’s decision-making about the product.”364
Congressional attention to the validity of CPSC reports is not
an accident. A series of inaccurate product safety warnings
inspired Congress to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act
in 1981 to improve procedural safeguards for Commission
announcements.365
The procedures for SaferProducts.gov are already being
tested. In a recent case, Company Doe v. Tenenbaum, a
company anonymously challenged an inaccurate product safety
report in the database.366 The court found that the CPSC
database “bears the Government’s stamp of approval through
its publication on an official website that, by its terms, is a
repository of reports regarding ‘unsafe products.’”367 The court
sustained the company’s challenge, somewhat remarkably,368
finding that the CPSC posting “materially inaccurate”
information on SaferProducts.gov was not only “final agency
action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but also
violated the CPSC’s own regulations.369 In the vast majority of
similar cases, courts find that negative statements or other
adverse public disclosures by agencies are not “final” under the
APA and thus cannot support a cause of action against the
government.370 The CPSC litigation thus could provide a
roadmap for other litigants similarly aggrieved.
Although SaferProducts.gov’s pre- and post-publication
procedures might serve as a useful model for other agency
databases, challenges certainly remain. For instance, it is not
362. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(c)(2).
363. Id. § 2055a(c)(4).
364. 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26(a)(1) (2011).
365. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
703 (1981); CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 11; James T. O’Reilly, Libels on
Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet Defamation, 55
ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 542–43 (2003).
366. Co. Doe v. Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Co. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
367. Id. at 597.
368. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at app. C (surveying similar cases and finding
few successful challenges).
369. Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
370. Cortez, supra note 75, at 1443–44.
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clear how often consumers use the data to make purchasing
decisions (perhaps the data is more useful to distributors and
others in the supply chain), nor is it clear whether publishing
the data inspires manufacturers to improve product safety
apart from other requirements. And presentation remains
critical. A GAO review found that some users were confused
about the purpose of SaferProducts.gov, viewing it as a site
featuring safe rather than unsafe products.371 The “upbeat”
name of the database might have contributed to such
misperceptions.372 The GAO also found that although the
CPSC had used various methods to inform consumers about
SaferProducts.gov (which at the time generated at least
100,000 page visits a month), including use of social media, the
agency could do more to publicize the resource.373
Perhaps third-party informational products could leverage
the data more effectively—for example, by creating mobile
phone apps that can scan products in the aisle and display a
brief product safety profile generated by data from
SaferProducts.gov. Or, large online retailers like Amazon.com
might find novel uses for such data, triangulating it with user
reviews. Like other agencies, the CPSC’s open government
website allows users to download raw data files, with
voluminous links to the agency’s open data plans.374 Thirdparty intermediaries might be particularly helpful at
translating “big” product safety data into comparative ratings
accessible to ordinary consumers.
E.

Medicare’s Quality Data

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
administers Medicare, our federal health insurance program
for the elderly and chronically disabled. Because Medicare pays

371. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
GAO-13-306, AWARENESS, USE, AND USEFULNESS OF SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652916.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3M6-WXMG]
[hereinafter CPSC: AWARENESS, USE, AND USEFULNESS].
372. Id. at 27; Upbeat Name of SaferProducts.gov Confuses Users, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Mar. 12, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/20
13/03/upbeat-name-of-saferproducts-gov-confuses-users/index.htm [https://perma.
cc/YC57-KQYT] (discussing the 2013 GAO report).
373. CPSC: AWARENESS, USE, AND USEFULNESS, supra note 371, at 12–14.
374. The CPSC Open Government Plan, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/ (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7SDY-6YU9].
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thousands of nongovernmental physicians, hospitals, and other
types of providers for care, beneficiaries often must choose
among multiple local providerssometimes scores or even
hundreds of such providers. But for a Medicare beneficiary that
needs cardiac surgery, for example, choosing a specific surgeon
in a specific hospital can be daunting.375
To facilitate such decisions, CMS operates five searchable
databases that compare Medicare providersHospital
Compare,376 Physician Compare,377 Nursing Home Compare,378
Home Health Compare,379 and Dialysis Facility Compare.380
The search functions all work in roughly the same way. Users
can search for providers by city, state, or ZIP code, and then
view a list of results within a twenty-five mile radius, each
sortable by different criteria. For example, the Nursing Home
and Dialysis Facility databases allow users to sort facilities
based on how they rate on a five-star scale.381 Hospitals are
sortable by distance, by whether they offer emergency services,
and by “hospital type.”382 Home Health facilities are listed by
the type of care offered, such as physical therapy and
occupational therapy.383 Physician searches are more
complicated (and are probably the least useful of the five),

375. For in-depth critiques of the consumer-driven health policy and the heroic
assumptions it often makes about patients’ capacity to understand and make
important medical and spending decisions, see TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST,
HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007)
and Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008).
376. Hospital Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/SG2Q-RVBY].
377. Physician Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/search.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/E7DN-6P59].
378. Nursing Home Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/search.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/E7DN-6P59].
379. Home Health Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/homehealthcompare/search.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/N6Q7-K3BQ].
380. Dialysis Facility Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/dialysisfacilitycompare/#search (last visited Aug. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/R278-XGKV].
381. See Nursing Home Compare, supra note 378; Dialysis Facility Compare,
supra note 380.
382. See Hospital Compare, supra note 376.
383. See Home Health Compare, supra note 379.
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requiring the user to also search for a physician’s name,
specialty, or medical condition to help narrow the results.384
The five databases offer quite distinct data on “quality.”
Hospital Compare includes data on over 4,000 hospitals
nationwide,385 allowing users to compare up to three hospitals
at a time, using six categories: “Survey of Patients’
Experiences,” “Timely & Effective Care,” “Complications,
Readmissions & Deaths,” “Use of Medical Imaging,” and
“Payment & Value of Care.” Each tab, moreover, includes
several subcategories of information. For example, “Timely &
Effective Care” is divided into ten subcategories, such as
“Heart Attack Care” and “Stroke Care.”386 Results are
compared to state and national averages as reference points.
The data displayed, however, are less satisfying than the
categories might suggest. A frustrating proportion of data for
hospitals is listed as “Not Available,” with numbered footnotes
explaining why.387 The tab titled “Payment & Value of Care”
might tantalize health policy wonks, but unfortunately,
comparative data often is not displayed directly (e.g., “Get
Results for This Hospital” is displayed when searching for
Medicare spending per beneficiary) or meaningfully (e.g., “No
Different than the National Average Payment” is frequently
displayed). Also, “Value of Care” metrics tend to display charts
full of “No Different than the National Rate” and “No Different
than the National Average Payment.”
An afternoon on Hospital Compare leaves one with the
impression that there are probably too many categories and
subcategories of data for the average person to make
meaningful comparisons, particularly when much of the data is
“Not Available.” Thus, although CMS touts Hospital Compare
as “an important tool for individuals to use in making decisions
384. Physician Compare: About the Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/abouttheda
ta.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6NDV-4TG7].
385. What is Hospital Compare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/
hospitalcompare/About/What-Is-HOS.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/ZFG3-DC4C].
386. The ten categories are Heart Attack Care, Heart Failure Care, Pneumonia
Care, Surgical Care, Emergency Department Care, Preventative Care, Children’s
Asthma Care, Stroke Care, Blood Clot Prevention & Treatment, and Pregnancy &
Delivery Care.
387. Hospital Compare, Footnotes, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/
hospitalcompare/Data/Footnotes.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.
cc/P4VF-HZ7D].
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about health care options,” it is probably more successful at
meeting CMS’s other aspiration as “a way to encourage
accountability of hospitals for the care they provide to
patients.”388 Still, given how incomplete the data is, it is
questionable whether it meets even this goal.
Physician quality data is even more limited, perhaps
reflecting physicians’ longstanding concerns over reputation
and liability.389 Physician Compare includes only directory-type
information, such as the name and location of the physician,
hospital admitting privileges, and information about
physician’s education and board certifications. But there are
few quality metrics. Physician Compare does feature a
Physician Quality Reporting System, but it merely asks
physicians to report whether they follow certain best
practices.390 Physicians who report to CMS are then given
performance scores. Unfortunately, the system is voluntary,
and only some Physician Compare profiles include their
performance scores.391 Although there are over 200 reportable
quality measures, few are listed on Physician Compare.392

388. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2006 Rates, 70 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,420 (Aug.
12, 2005).
389. For a discussion of how transparency often challenges professional
reputation while privacy reinforces it, including a discussion of corporate
reputation, see William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical
Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (Virginia A.
Sharpe, ed. 2004).
390. For a list of examples, see Physician Compare, Physician Quality
Reporting System (PQRS), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.
medicare.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/pqrs.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/834A-9JRH].
391. Id.
392. The site itself explains how the data is limited:
At this time, not all health care professionals and group practices have
quality measure performance scores on their Physician Compare profile
page. Some health care professionals and group practices are committed
to providing high quality care, but do not have quality measures. There
are many reasons why health care professionals and group practices do
not have quality measures for review. There are more than 200 quality
measures that can be reported to CMS through multiple reporting
methods. However, only certain measures reported through some of the
reporting methods are currently available. Over time, more quality
measures will be added to Physician Compare and more health care
professionals and group practices will have measures available.
Id.
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Still, the star ratings available on databases like Nursing
Home Compare and Dialysis Facility Compare are easily
accessible across a number of facilities and probably do help
users searching for facilities nearby. Of course, Medicare
quality data has many potential uses for many potential
audiences, ranging from patients looking to choose the best
surgeon or hospital, to providers evaluating their own
performance, to policymakers seeking to understand broader
trends in care.393
These databases had humble beginnings. In 2005, CMS
first published ten different quality measures for hospitals
across the United States, sprouting from a partnership
between CMS and the Hospital Quality Alliance.394 In
subsequent years, CMS has continued to add data from a
variety of sources, including patient experience ratings,
mortality rates for certain conditions, and hospital readmission
rates, among many others.395 Today’s Compare databases are
an amalgam of data from a variety of sources, gradually added
like ornaments to a Christmas tree.396
Perhaps the richest potential source of data is Medicare
claims data. CMS processes over a billion Medicare claims each
year,397 with each claim including multiple data points,
including whom Medicare is paying and for what. Medicare
claims data have long been used by academics, government
researchers, and providers themselves to better understand the
U.S. health care system.398 The growth of “big data” in health

393. Madison, supra note 30, at 1625.
394. Id. at 1626; Hospital Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-instruments
/hospitalqualityinits/hospitalcompare.html (last visited July 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/PY8M-5H2K]. The lineage of quality reporting in health also
stretches back to precursors, like patient-centered nursing home standards in the
wake of scandals involving nursing home deaths, passed under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203.
395. Madison, supra note 30, at 1626 (citing Hospital Compare, supra note
394).
396. As with other agencies, the raw data files at a separate site. See
DATA.MEDICARE.GOV, http://data.medicare.gov (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https:
//perma.cc/9TVL-DJNM].
397. Medicare Fee-for-Service, Payment Accuracy, PAYMENTACCURACY.GOV,
https://paymentaccuracy.gov/program/medicare-fee-for-service/ (last visited Aug.
21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 985Q-LGJP]; Madison, supra note 30, at 1607.
398. Madison, supra note 30, at 1609–10.
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care, in fact, roughly parallels and depends on the growth and
accessibility of Medicare claims data.399
Although Medicare has released various data to the public
for years, CMS was long restricted from releasing physician
claims data by court order.400 In 2014, a year after the order
was lifted, CMS released claims data for over 880,000
providers.401 The trend has been followed by statessixteen of
which have created all-payer claims databases that compile
claims data from almost all payers in the state, including
public and private insurers.402 However, in 2016 the Supreme
Court threw a wrench in these efforts when it interpreted
federal law as preempting state laws mandating reporting from
self-insured employer plans.403 As is common for many data
regimes, agencies often take two steps forward, then one step
back.
Traditionally, claims data has meant merely payment
data, without regard to the quality of care being provided. In
2003, Congress amended Medicare’s payment formulas to
encourage hospitals to report quality data,404 and today over
1,300 hospitals report data about infection rates, mortality
rates, and other quality indicators in order to boost their
Medicare reimbursements,405 all of which feed into the
Hospital Compare site. Medicare extended these incentives
from hospitals to physicians in 2006 and, by 2017 will require
it.406 Yet, realizing that not everyone is covered by Medicare,

399. Id. at 1610.
400. Fla. Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 947 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1329 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (describing the longstanding injunction).
401. Madison, supra note 30, at 1611; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Historic Release of Data Gives Consumers Unprecedented
Transparency on the Medical Services Physicians Provide and How Much They
Are Paid (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/04/20140409
a.html [https://perma.cc/WJ8R-M93R].
402. John D. Freedman et al., All-Payer Claims Databases – Uses and
Expanded Prospects after Gobeille, 23 N. ENG. J. MED. 375, 2016 WL 37580714
(Dec. 8, 2016).
403. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S.Ct. 936 (2016) (invalidating a
Vermont law requiring self-insured employers to submit claims data on grounds
of ERISA preemption).
404. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 501(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2289 (amending 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(b)(3)(B)).
405. Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496, 50,678–80 (Aug. 19, 2013).
406. Madison, supra note 30, at 1613; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., PHYSICIAN QUALITY REPORTING SYSTEM (PQRS) OVERVIEW 2–3 (Aug. 8,

2018]

REGULATION BY DATABASE

61

Congress required CMS to release broad swaths of Medicare
claims data regarding hospital care, physician care,
prescription drugs, and other goods and services to enable
private entities to add Medicare data to other data, on the
condition that such entities generate publicly accessible quality
ratings.407 Thus, various data sources are being combined in
novel ways.
Nevertheless, scholars have long questioned the utility of
performance data and report cards in the health industry,408
and disclosure more generally has long been a point of interest
to health law scholars.409 Patients report that they seldom rely
on publicly available data or even more comprehensible report
cards of physicians, hospitals, or procedures.410 A 2012 survey
found that only 15 percent of patients reviewed online quality
rankings or reviews when choosing doctors or hospitals, with
the most frequent users being the most educated middle-aged
users.411 Patients frequently are not aware of the information,
do not understand it, or do not use it.412 Indeed, of the
numerous disclosure regimes analyzed by Fung, Graham, and
Weil, they found patient safety disclosures to be among the
least effective, due to the complexity of the information,
cognitive biases, the likelihood the data would be

2016), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instr
uments/PQRS/Downloads/PQRS_OverviewFactSheet_2013_08_06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3UL-UEHW].
407. Madison, supra note 30, at 1614–15; Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 10332, 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk(e); Availability of Medicare Data for
Performance Measurement, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,542, 76,567 (Dec. 7, 2011) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 401); Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-10 § 105; Expanding Uses of Medicare Data by Qualified Entities, 81
Fed. Reg. 44,456 (July 7, 2016) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 401).
408. There is voluminous literature on this point. See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein,
Rolling Down the Runway: The Challenges Ahead for Quality Report Cards, 279
JAMA 1691(1998); Martin M. Marshall et al., The Public Release of Performance
Data: What Do We Expect to Gain? A Review of Evidence, 283 JAMA 1866 (2000);
Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of Public Performance Reports: A
Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 JAMA 1638 (1998).
409. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 5.
410. Id.
411. SUSANNAH FOX & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HEALTH ONLINE
2013, at 20–23 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/
PIP_HealthOnline.pdf [https://perma.cc/88VW-SYDT].
412. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 672, 711–12 (citing studies).
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misinterpreted, and the risk of strategic behavior by
providers.413
As a result, CMS has tried to “shrink” the voluminous and
varied data by translating them into star ratings, using a fivestar scale.414 Five stars represents facilities that are “much
above average,” four stars are “above average,” three stars are
“average,” and so on.415 Users can access the underlying data
on the same site, including charts comparing each facility to
the state and national averages.
More problematic is that studies reveal that those being
measuredhospitals, physicians, and other providerscan
respond in perverse ways to protect their ratings. Providers
have been known to avoid sicker or more complicated patients
for fear of compromising their scores on outcomes
measurements.416 For example, a study of cardiac surgery
report cards in Pennsylvania found that cardiac surgeons
responded to the new disclosure requirement by becoming more
reluctant to operate on sicker patients.417 The data is decidedly
mixed, however. For every finding that public reporting of
mortality rates reduced the rate of mortality, there are reports
of selection bias by surgeons avoiding more severe, complex
cases.418
Moreover, despite the prevalence of doctor and hospital
ratings and report cards, it is not clear whether consumers
really want them: “Most consumers do not believe clinical
quality varies significantly across doctors, hence the low
consumer demand for clinical quality report cards.”419 One

413. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 76–77 (analyzing disclosure requirements
in Pennsylvania and New York).
414. See, e.g., Nursing Home Compare, supra note 378; Madison, supra note 30,
at 1627.
415. Five-Star Quality Rating, Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/About/HowWeCalculate.html
(last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GP9L-QT83].
416. See, e.g., David Dranove et al., Is More Information Better? The Effects of
“Report Cards” on Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555 (2003); Sage,
supra note 5, at 1793.
417. Schneider & Epstein, supra note 408.
418. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 89 (citing studies).
419. HA T. TU & JOHANNA R. LAUER, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.
CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 9, WORD OF MOUTH AND PHYSICIAN REFERRALS
STILL DRIVE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER CHOICE 5 (2008), http://www.hschange
.org/CONTENT/1028/1028.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA9D-YFD6]; Epstein, supra note
408, at 1694.
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study found that less than one percent of patients knew how
their hospital or surgeon was rated under mandated ratings
systems.420 Thus, ratings might be better in theory than in
practice, at least for now.
CMS’s ratings have also generated litigation. A nursing
home in Illinois sued Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and CMS for mistakenly calculating its star
rating on Nursing Home Compare, giving the facility two stars
out of five rather than four.421 The mistaken star rating was
published on the CMS website, which did not correct it for
almost two years.422 The nursing home argued that HHS and
the Illinois Department of Public Health, which conducted the
underlying inspections, had violated its procedural due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.423 The
district court found that although the nursing home’s low star
rating probably did affect its reputation, “reputational harm
does not require due process protection.”424 The court agreed
with the government that although a “mistaken rating could
have caused some potential patients to look elsewhere for their
care,” it did not rise to a property interest.425 To qualify, the
nursing home would have to show that the reputational harm
also included some sort of “change in legal status,” as required
by the “stigma-plus” test.426 But the nursing home did not
present evidence that there was any such change in legal
statussuch as a ban on referrals to the facility, a change in
licensing status or reimbursement status, or some other
tangible harm.427 Thus, the court called the mistake (and the
nearly two-year delay in fixing it) “unfortunate,” but not
something rising to a liberty or property interest protected by
due process.428

420. Epstein, supra note 408, at 1694.
421. Bryn Mawr Care v. Sebelius, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1011–12.
424. Id. at 1012.
425. Id. at 1013.
426. Id. at 1014.
427. Id. at 1014–15.
428. Id. at 1018. For a survey of federal opinions between 1974–2014 in which
a private party challenged an agency announcement, identifying cases that
invoked due process arguments, see CORTEZ, supra note 143, at app. C.
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Still, quality ratings and other disclosure-based regulation
remains all the rage in health policy,429 with contemporary
proposals littered with patient surveys, outcomes data, star
ratings or rankings, and of course federal databases like those
mentioned above that combine many of these data points.430
Again, scholars have long been aware of the benefits, burdens,
and limitations of using disclosure as a regulatory tool in
health care.431 Yet, it is possible, if not probable, that efforts to
replace the Affordable Care Act432 will rely heavily on
disclosure to facilitate market-based reforms.
F.

The FDA’s Adverse Event Data

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) maintains
several online databases that track problems with the products
and companies it regulates. For example, the agency publishes
several enforcement databases that allow users to search for
FDA inspections,433 warning letters,434 recalls,435 and
enforcement reports.436 The FDA also maintains a database of
good newsagency product approvals.437 But perhaps the most
429. In April 2016, for example, Health Affairs dedicated an issue to “Patients’
and Consumers’ Use of Evidence,” with several articles focused on recent datareporting initiatives targeted at patient use. See Patients’ and Consumers’ Use of
Evidence, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1 (2016).
430. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 160–62 (listing various disclosure
systems in health care).
431. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 5.
432. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
433. Inspections Database, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/Inspections/ucm222557.htm (last updated July 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/2STT-KK5B].
434. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations:
Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ (last updated July 11, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/4K9T-AE5S].
435. Recalls, Market Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/default.htm (last updated July 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/PN4A-WCBQ].
436. Enforcement Report, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/ires/index.cfm#tabNav_advancedSearch (last visited July 15, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/XG38-7CAT].
437. Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfd a/index.cfm (last visited July
15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DT4E-6MWB].
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well-known FDA databases are those that track adverse events
associated with pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
The FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS)
includes a database of medication errors and adverse drug
events reported to the agency.438 Adverse event reporting dates
back at least thirty-five years, and perhaps even longer, when
the agency received reports by paper.439 Manufacturer reports
are required by regulation,440 but reports by health care
professionals and consumers are only voluntary.441
Evolving from previous iterations,442 today’s database
remains primarily a tool for the FDA to monitor safety
problems, rather than a tool aimed for use by the general
public. In fact, the FAERS “database” is not really searchable
to most users. The FAERS website includes aggregate
statistics, as well as links to raw data files that include
individual case reports.443 But the raw data files are published
only in quarterly increments,444 and are not amenable to
simple searches, as the agency notes (“A simple search of
FAERS data cannot be performed with these files by persons
who are not familiar with creation of relational databases”).445
438. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS): Latest Quarterly Data
Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecompliance
regulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffects/ucm082193.htm
(last updated June 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4UC2-BGYP].
439. Postmarketing Safety Reports for Human Drug and Biological Products;
Electronic Submission Requirements, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,072, 33,073 (June 10, 2014).
Indeed, one source notes that the FDA has maintained an adverse event database
in some form since 1967. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 44 (citing David Gortler,
Adverse Event Databases (AERS Database), http://50.63.91.31/FDA-adverse-eventdatabase.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6CQG-7MMP]).
440. 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305 (adverse event reports for drugs marketed without
approved new drug approval applications), 312.32 (investigational drug safety
reports), 314.80 (postmarketing reporting).
441. Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplia
nceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffects/ (last updated May 5,
2016) [https://perma.cc/2C5Q-R3SB] [hereinafter FAERS].
442. In September 2012, FAERS replaced the previous Adverse Event
Reporting System (AERS), which itself derives from an earlier reboot of the FDA’s
pharmacovigilance system. See 74 Fed. Reg. 42,184, 42,185 (Aug. 21, 2009); 63
Fed. Reg. 65,000, 65,030 (Nov. 24, 1998).
443. FAERS, supra note 441.
444. FDA Adverse Event Report System (FAERS), Latest Quarterly Data Files,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregula
toryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffects/ucm082193.htm (last updated
June 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4UC2-BGYP].
445. FAERS, supra note 441.
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The FDA also instructs potential users to request individual
case safety reports by submitting a FOIA request.446 Individual
reports are accessible, however, by searching the FDA’s
MedWatch website, which aggregates “clinically important
safety information” for “human medical products,” including
drugs, devices, and biologics.447
The device counterpart to FAERS is MAUDE
(Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience), a
database of device adverse events,448 which the agency began
collecting in 1984.449 Today, MAUDE includes both mandatory
and voluntary adverse event reports, with downloadable data
files, including reports dating back to the 1990s and an online
searchable database covering the last ten years.450 The
MAUDE database allows users to search for medical devices
that may have malfunctioned or caused death or serious
injury.451 Users can search by a pull down menu of product
problems, by the class of product, or by manufacturer, model,
or brand name.452 Like FAERS, MAUDE is designed to help
the FDA monitor emerging product safety problems, but unlike
FAERS, the centralized search function makes the data more
accessible to lay users.
Like other agencies, the FDA is trying to publish FAERS,
MAUDE, and other databases in more user-friendly formats on
its Open FDA site.453 The site, launched in 2014, includes

446. Id.
447. MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting
Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/defaul
t.htm (last updated July 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LA7G-D9YP]; see also David
A. Kessler et al., Introducing MEDWatch: A New Approach to Reporting
Medication and Device Adverse Effects and Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765
(June 2, 1993).
448. MAUDE - Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search.
cfm (last updated June 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GJ8S-LG88] [hereinafter
MAUDE].
449. Medical Device Reporting, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,326 (Sept. 14, 1984).
450. Mandatory Reporting Requirements: Manufacturers, Importers, and
Device User Facilities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdver
seEvents/ucm2005737.htm (last updated Nov. 7, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y4BF49CG].
451. Id.
452. MAUDE, supra note 448.
453. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 44; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Open-source
APIs and a Developer Community for FDA Data, OPENFDA, https://open.fda.gov
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separate pages for food products, drugs, and devices, with all
three including enforcement reports, and the drug and device
pages, including adverse event databases.454 Open FDA
publishes both individual reports and larger trend analyses.
For example, as of March 2016, the site included almost 5.9
million records in its adverse drug event database dating back
to 2004.455 Open FDA includes extensive data tools and
downloadable raw data files, obviously directed at third-party
users.
Also like other agencies, the FDA is beginning to
incorporate multiple data sources to pursue regulatory goals, in
this case uncovering trends with medical product safety. In
2007, Congress required HHS and the FDA to coordinate with
non-FDA sources, including “public, academic, and private
entities” to “link and analyze safety data from multiple
sources,” with an idea of uncovering emerging product safety
risks.456 The goal was to include at least 100 million patients in
the dataset by 2012.457 Called the FDA Sentinel Initiative, the
effort has been designed to monitor product safety across
different data sources, including data from Medicare, the
Veterans Health Administration, and large private health
insurers.458
But again, like other databases, the FDA’s adverse event
databases are not always complete or accurate. A 2011 study
found widespread errors and incomplete reports filed in
MedWatch, including more than 25 percent of reports using
inaccurate product names.459 More than most agencies, then,
(last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QZD4-8SJQ] [hereinafter Opensource APIs].
454. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 44; Open-source APIs, supra note 453.
455. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Adverse Drug Event Reports Since 2004,
OPENFDA, https://open.fda.gov/drug/event/ (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/W632-KAXA].
456. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11085, § 905(a), 121 Stat. 823, 944 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
457. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B).
458. Madison, supra note 30, at 1615–16; see also Barbara J. Evans, Authority
of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control Use
Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67 (2010) (considering
whether participation in the Sentinel Initiative might be mandatory rather than
voluntary).
459. Kenneth A. Getz et al., Evaluating the Completeness and Accuracy of
MedWatch Data, 21 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 442 (2014) (relying on a 2011 study by
the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development).
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the FDA includes prominent disclaimers of the accuracy and
reliability of its data.460 For example, the MAUDE database
includes the following disclaimer:
Although [Medical Device Reports] are a valuable source of
information, this passive surveillance system has
limitations, including the potential submission of
incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased data.
In addition, the incidence or prevalence of an event cannot
be determined from this reporting system alone due to
potential under-reporting of events and lack of information
about frequency of device use.
***
Confirming whether a device actually caused a specific
event can be difficult based solely on information provided
in a given report. Establishing a cause-and-effect
relationship is especially difficult if circumstances
surrounding the event have not been verified or if the device
in question has not been directly evaluated.461

Similarly, FAERS emphasizes that the “data does have
limitations”:
First, there is no certainty that the reported event (adverse
event or medication error) was actually due to the product.
FDA does not require that a causal relationship between a
product and event be proven, and reports do not always
contain enough detail to properly evaluate an event.
Further, FDA does not receive reports for every adverse
event or medication error that occurs with a product. Many
factors can influence whether or not an event will be
reported, such as the time a product has been marketed and
publicity about an event. Therefore, FAERS data cannot be
used to calculate the incidence of an adverse event or
medication error in the U.S. population.462

The Open FDA site also confronts users, via pop-up
window, with a note of caution that “[t]his API is not for

460.
461.
462.

CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 44.
MAUDE, supra note 448.
FAERS, supra note 441.
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clinical or production use. While we make every effort to ensure
that data is accurate, you should assume all results are
unvalidated.”463 Should policymakers settle for data of such
quality? Are incomplete and unrepresentative data better than
none? If so, how best can scarce resources be deployed to
improve the accuracy, reliability, and usefulness of the FDA’s
data?
There remains great hope that modern tools like agency
databases can improve drug safety, even if the data are
imperfect, by combining FDA data with other data sources, like
Medicare claims, for example.464 Thus, an alliance between the
FDA and CMS to combine their data might help cure some
defects in the FDA’s adverse event reporting systems.465 Still,
policymakers might counter widespread underreporting by
experimenting with automated monitoring systems relying on
digital technologies. For example, digital pill trackers and
other mobile monitoring devices might send automatic problem
reports to the FDA,466 subject to pre- and post-publication
safeguards described above.
V.

DESIGNING FOR OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE

How can policymakers design databases that realize their
many aspirations while minimizing their shortcomings and
burdens? At core, how can policymakers ensure the quality and
reliability of agency data, so that users trust the data being
published?467 My first prescription is modesty. As Richard
Craswell cautions, “people who expect disclosure laws to solve

463. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drugs – Adverse Events, OPENFDA,
https://open.fda.gov/drug/event/ (last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4JR2TB5R].
464. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Opening Pandora’s Pillbox: Using Modern
Information Tools to Improve Drug Safety, 24 HEALTH AFF. 938 (2005).
465. Id.
466. For a very broad survey of some of the recent digital technologies, see
Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173
(2014).
467. These values derive, not coincidentally, from the Information Quality Act.
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 515,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 3516.
Note also that the GAO has discussed what it means for data to be “reliable.” See
APPLIED RESEARCH & METHODS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASSESSING
THE RELIABILITY OF COMPUTER PROCESSED DATA 5 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/80/77213.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5L-XECR].
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almost every problemquickly, easily, and with very little
costare doomed to have their expectations crushed.”468 The
truth is that regulation by database requires just as many
difficult design and implementation choices as any other form
of regulation.469 The early successes of the CFPB’s Consumer
Complaint Database and the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov site, for
example, are owed to several canny decisions by Congress and
the agencies to ensure the quality of the data posted.470 It is a
mistake, then, to assume that creating a public database is
necessarily less difficult and more cost-effective than
traditional regulation.
Another important consideration is that agency databases
vary widely in their purposes, scope, design, sources, and
presentation. Although it is neither possible nor worthwhile to
prescribe universal rules of thumb here, I try to highlight
emerging best practices from the databases I have evaluated to
date, in the hopes that these discussions will be useful to
policymakers. Again, these recommendations build on, and in
many ways exceed, those recently promulgated by ACUS.471 In
short, the most successful disclosure regimes will carefully
consider both data inputs (how data will be collected and from
whom) and outputs (how the data will be published and
presented).472
I thus offer a series of recommendations that address both
dimensions, proposing a decidedly modern role for the
government as a “data steward.” For example, agencies must
consider how to gather and process the data, including
carefully choosing sources and crafting adequate pre- and postpublication procedures to ensure data quality. Agencies also
should not underestimate the costs required to generate and
maintain their databases, as well as the potential overlap with
agency enforcement and adjudication procedures. Finally,
agencies should think carefully about potential audiences and
users in deciding how to characterize and present the data.
468. Craswell, supra note 18, at 379.
469. Id.
470. See discussion supra Sections IV.C & IV.D.
471. ACUS Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259 (June 21,
2016).
472. For parallel thinking on how to improve quality reporting in health care,
including data selection, design, reporting, and presentation, see Kristin Madison,
Legal and Policy Issues in Measuring and Improving Quality, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 680 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
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Gathering and Processing the Data

Policymakers should think carefully, and ideally in
advance, about data inputs. Whose data will populate the data
sets? How will it be gathered? To what extent will the agency
try to verify, validate, or otherwise authenticate the data? And
how will the agency handle contested data?
As a threshold matter, it is particularly important that
agencies identify reliable data sources. The irony here is that
the internet not only facilitates many of the disclosures
discussed in this Article, but also (by virtue of soliciting data
from a variety of sources) raises problems with reliability.473
Thus, government agencies can play an important role by
ensuring that published data is credible.474 Indeed, because the
very fact of publication by a government agency often signals
credibility, it is incumbent on agencies to ensure the accuracy
of data that purports to be objective.475 Notice-and-comment
procedures might be useful in soliciting feedback on what
sources are reliable and why.
As Kristin Madison argues, the federal government is more
than just a repository for datait is also a “data steward”
responsible for actively managing the data it holds, helping to
ensure its integrity.476 The CFPB, for example, does not verify
that consumer complaints are “accurate” (in other words, that
the conduct alleged in the complaint actually occurred), but
does help “authenticate” that each complaint is made by an
actual customer of the company, giving the company ample
opportunity to identify false or fraudulent complaints.477
Likewise, when Congress authorized SaferProducts.gov, it
required the CPSC to consider objections that the information
is “materially inaccurate.”478 Again, the CFPB and CPSC
demonstrate two frameworks for active data stewardship.
In short, agencies that purport to publish accurate and
objective data should adopt procedures to these ends. As
473. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 165 (“Those who contribute
information can do so without identifying themselves or their sponsoring
organizations, or taking responsibility for what they are saying.”).
474. Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 243, at 1476.
475. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 44.
476. Madison, supra note 30, at 1607–08.
477. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,218, 21,225–26
(Apr. 10, 2013).
478. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(c)(4) (2012).
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emphasized in Part II, because “transparency” is frequently
invoked to support disclosure, it is important to remember that
“transparency” allows objects to be “seen without distortion.”479
To the extent feasible, then, government databases should try
to achieve genuine transparency rather than “translucency.”480
Indeed, some scholars note that, inevitably, disclosure regimes
created through the political process are forged by conflict and
compromise, and thus generate only partial or imperfect
transparency.481 But scholars also find that the more successful
disclosure regimes tend to increase the accuracy and quality of
the information they publish over time.482 Databases should be
dynamic rather than staticconstant works in progress.
Although initial design choices are important, agencies should
not hesitate to tinker with data collection procedures if flaws in
the data become apparent, as in the case of the EPA’s Toxic
Release Inventory.
1. Pre-Publication Procedures
Data sets that purport to publish accurate, objective
information should be buttressed, ideally, with both pre- and
post-publication procedures that allow parties to request that
any information not meeting these standards be corrected or
retracted. Again, some of the newer agency databases provide
parties with pre-publication procedures to comment on,
challenge, or request corrections and retractions of information
before publication.483 For example, by statute the CPSC must
give
companies
whose
products
are
reported
to
SaferProducts.gov the opportunity to comment on any Reports
of Harm.484 The CPSC must consider objections that the
information is “materially inaccurate,”485 and the Commission
publishes these procedures in the C.F.R.486 There are clear

479. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1343 (referring to the Oxford English
Dictionary’s definition of “transparency”).
480. Id. at 1345. The Schauer distinction between transparency and
translucency is subject to the objection, of course, that it assumes that the state
could ever be completely “transparent,” providing undistorted access to itself.
481. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xii.
482. Id. at 109.
483. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 94–95.
484. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(c)(2) (2012).
485. Id. § 2055a(c)(4).
486. 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26.
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timelines for parties to object to alleged inaccuracies and for
the CPSC to resolve disputes before publication.487 Likewise,
the CFPB authenticates that complaints are coming from
actual customers of the company.488 Bureau procedures allow
companies to use an online company portal to verify a
commercial relationship with the customer and post the
company’s response.489 The Bureau also makes clear that each
complaint, before being published in the database, must meet
several publication criteria.490 Of all the databases discussed in
Part IV, the CPSC and CFPB procedures serve as the best
models for pre-publication quality control.
2. Post-Publication Procedures for Contested Data
Nevertheless, errors in published data sets are probably
inevitable, no matter how robust the pre-publication
procedures may be. As a result, policymakers should also
consider post-publication procedures as a backstop to help
ensure the quality and reliability of data. Scholars have long
recognized that such procedures can be an important safety
valve for parties named in agency publications, as legal
recourse is generally not available.491
Here, the controversial Information or Data Quality Act
might be of help.492 The Act required the OMB to publish
government-wide guidelines for “ensuring and maximizing the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . .
disseminated by the government.”493 The Act applies broadly to
“[f]ederal agency dissemination of public information,
regardless of the form or format.”494 It also directed the OMB to

487. 15 U.S.C. § 2055.
488. Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,616, 37,616–17
(June 22, 2012).
489. COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL, supra note 316.
490. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 63–64.
491. Gellhorn, supra note 169; CORTEZ, supra note 143, at app. C.
492. The Act has been criticized as an attempt to thwart regulators in the
guise of data quality. See, e.g., Levy & Johns, supra note 27, at 2.
493. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001). The
IQA is built on earlier provisions in the Paperwork Reduction Act. Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, 168.
494. 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8460 (Feb. 22, 2002). OMB guidelines define
“information” as “any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts
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establish procedures that allow “affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated
by the agency.”495 Per the OMB’s guidelines, dozens of federal
agencies have published their own such guidelines and postpublication
procedures
for
correcting
or
retracting
information.496 Although these procedures would seem to have
clear application to agency databases, the OMB guidelines
include two important exemptions. First, they exclude from the
IQA’s coverage “opinions, where the agency’s presentation
makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion
rather than fact or the agency’s views.”497 Second, they exclude
“adjudicative processes.”498 Thus, both exemptions could be
read as excluding, for example, the CFPB’s Consumer
Complaint Database, which might be fairly characterized as
including “opinions” or even “adjudicative processes.”499
Nevertheless, the IQA and resulting agency guidelines
articulate both substantive and procedural values that
agencies should observe. To ensure the quality and reliability
of government-published information, there should be a safety
valve that allows the subjects identified to request correction or
retraction by the agency.
A 2015 study by the GAO found eighty-seven publiclyreported requests for corrections or retractions under the IQA
sent to thirty agencies between 2010 and 2014.500 Although the
agencies denied fifty-nine out of the eighty-seven requests, the
agencies made full corrections in eleven cases and partial

or data, in any medium or form,” including “information that an agency
disseminates from a web page.” Id.
495. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515.
496. See Agency Information Quality Guidelines, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg_agency_info_quality_links/
[https://perma.cc/8YZZ-PKRF].
497. 67 Fed. Reg. at 8453–54.
498. Id. at 8454.
499. CORTEZ, supra note 143. Of course, industry members have argued that
the CFPB’s database is subject to the IQA. See, e.g., Letter from Wayne A.
Abernathy of the American Bankers Association to Hon. Mark Bialek, Inspector
General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/01/LTC-ConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8JA-XWBL].
500. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-110, INFORMATION QUALITY
ACT: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING OF
CORRECTION REQUESTS 8 (2015) http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674386.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KXN-FHHF] [hereinafter GAO-16-110].

2018]

REGULATION BY DATABASE

75

corrections in fifteen cases (two cases were unresolved as of the
date of the report).501 For example, HHS updated information
on several CDC websites regarding bicycle helmet safety data
in response to a request made under CDC, HHS, and OMB
data quality guidelines.502 Moreover, in fifteen of the fifty-nine
cases denying the IQA request, the agency used alternative
procedural mechanisms, usually systems that predated the
IQA.503 In some cases, the agency engaged in long substantive
exchanges on the accuracy, presentation, and usability of
data.504
Post-publication procedures might also reside outside,
rather than inside, the agency. My review for ACUS, for
example, considered whether independent bodies like the
OMB, ombudsmen, or inspectors general might play a role in
superintending disputes over agency data.505
First, the OMB already exerts both centripetal and
centrifugal pressures on agency data collection and publication
practices. In addition to the OMB’s IQA guidelines, the
Paperwork Reduction Act requires the OMB to preapprove
significant information gathering efforts by agencies.506 The
agency must explain to the OMB why it needs the information,
why it has “practical utility,” and why it is relevant to the
agency’s regulatory functions.507 Thus, the OMB can play a
useful standardizing role. But it is not well suited to resolving
disputes between agencies and regulated parties, and agencies
may bristle at having to endure further layers of OMB review.
Second, many agencies maintain an Office of the
Ombudsman or its equivalent, which can field complaints
about data published by agencies. For example, the CFPB’s
Ombudsman has heard complaints about the Consumer
501. Id. at 17–18 tbl.4.
502. Letter from James G. Titus, Washington Area Bicyclist Ass’n, to Ctr. for
Disease Control (Feb. 28, 2013), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/105
661/44aCDC.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GQG-ANX6 ]; Response Letter from G. David
Williamson, Ctr. for Disease Control, to James G. Titus, Washington Area
Bicyclist Ass’n (July 11, 2013), https://aspe.hhs.gov/cdc-—-bicycle-helmet-safetyb2 [https://perma.cc/5UGN-8U44].
503. GAO-16-110, supra note 500, at 18–21.
504. See, e.g., Letter from Mary Pratt, CMS, to Jackson Williams, Dir. of Gov’t
Affairs, Dialysis Patient Citizens (Sept. 9, 2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
system/files/pdf/110656/51b5.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJA9-2NGX].
505. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 100–02.
506. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d) (2012).
507. Id. § 3508.
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Complaint Database,508 and the FDA’s many ombudsmen have
fielded complaints under the IQA.509 Ombuds can serve
important customer service functions with regulated parties.
As such, the use of ombuds in federal agencies has increased in
recent years, as have calls for standards regarding their
independence, duties, and information-providing roles.510
A third option is review by agencies’ inspectors general.
Inspectors general (IGs) are independent officers, directed by
law to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in federal
agencies.511 They also maintain, by design, crucial
independence from agency heads, and thus can serve as an
independent arbiter.512 They can also function as an avenue for
fielding industry complaints.513 The Federal Reserve’s Office of
Inspector General is, in fact, auditing the CFPB’s Consumer
Complaint Database “to assess the effectiveness of the CFPB’s
controls over the accuracy and completeness of the public
complaint database.”514
Finally, chief information officers (CIOs) within agencies
might play an important role in not only answering important
questions regarding database design, but also in participating
in pre- and post-publication procedures described above. They
are most likely to be informed of other agencies’ experiences
and able to critically evaluate whether those models might
translate well to their own data regimes.

508. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE DIRECTOR 5, 6 (2014).
509. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND PROBLEM SOLVING 2, http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/work-

plan-full.htm#CFPBOngoing (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BQ2XPF2T].
510. See, e.g., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., The Use of Ombuds in Federal
Agencies, (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/use-ombudsfederal-agencies [https://perma.cc/9QT5-9ZAK].
511. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101.
512. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2347 (2006).
513. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 101.
514. Work Plan: Audit of the CFPB’s Public Consumer Complaint Database,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. RESERVE, https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/
cfpb-management-controls-consumer-complaint-database-sep2015.pdf (last visited
June 5, 2015) [https://perma.cc/95SH-V8TQ].
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3. Considering Costs
Procedural safeguards can be essential for ensuring data
quality, though they are not without cost. Too often
government agencies try to achieve disclosure on the cheap.515
Data collection and processing requires not just automation,
but also human labor. Unfortunately, such labor is dismissed
as the task of “data janitors” who receive inadequate
compensation.516 The lack of sufficient infrastructure to ensure
data quality can generate “big bad data”517—data that are
voluminous but of low quality. Thus, meaningful data often
require meaningful investment to create a sufficient
information infrastructure.
Moreover, posting the data online can be costly. Running
an agency website is not a simple proposition. Web masters for
federal websites must comply with at least two dozen different
regulatory systems “[r]anging from privacy and usability to
FOIA compliance to the demands of the Paperwork Reduction
Act.”518 Although each separate requirement may stand on its
own logic, together they can limit how agencies present data,
and generally favor standardization above experimentation.519
As Robinson and colleagues observe, “[a]s long as the
government has a special role in the presentation and
formatting of raw government data, certain desirable limits on
what the government can do become undesirable limits on how
the data can be presented or handled.”520 In this vein,
nongovernmental intermediaries have proven useful in
rendering government data more accessible and usable,521 as I
discuss below in Section V.C.
Finally, all this assumes that policymakers have already
made the threshold decision to publish the data and accept

515. I am indebted to Frank Pasquale for raising many of the issues in this
paragraph.
516. See, e.g., Lilly Irani, Justice for “Data Janitors,” (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.publicbooks.org/nonfiction/justice-for-data-janitors
[https://perma.cc/YK9H-6AYU].
517. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health,
and Biomedical Databases, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2013).
518. David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 160, 162 (2009).
519. Id. at 163–65.
520. Id. at 165.
521. Id.
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responsibility for data stewardship. But because data
stewardship can be resource intensive, policymakers should
think more critically in advance about which data regimes
warrant the government’s scarce stewardship resources. Which
databases might be especially useful to consumers, or
particularly effective at inducing optimal behavior from
regulated entities? And of existing databases, which lowquality data sets might be worth salvaging? The FEC’s and
FDA’s databases might underwhelm in several ways, but few
would argue that more accurate, comprehensive campaign
finance data or drug safety data would not be worthwhile.
Thus, if stewardship is worth pursuing, limited resources
dictate that it must be targeted stewardship, focusing on the
data sets that are most likely to achieve the twin goals of being
useful to target audiences and changing behavior.522
4. Administrative Law Dimensions
Most interesting, from an administrative law perspective,
is that database publication procedures might be viewed as a
unique species of agency adjudication and regulatory
enforcement. Seen this way, database publication procedures
fall along a continuum ranging from very minimal verification
to more searching pre- and post-publication adjudication of
contested data. No database regimes currently approach the
full panoply of procedural safeguards that attach to more
formal administrative adjudications, pursuant to statutory and
due process requirements.523 But like traditional agency
adjudications, the amount of “procedure” appropriate for
database disputes will depend on what information each
database includes, the regulatory goals of publishing the
information, the statutory scheme in which it sits, and the cost
and value of “getting it right” versus “making it public.”
Another possibility is that legal sanctions begin to attach
more formally and more forcefully to database reporting such
that companies reporting inaccurate or incomplete data will
face fines, penalties, and other measurable burdens in addition
to any reputational damage. Could the Medicare program, for
example, condition reimbursement on accurate data

522.
523.

I credit Nick Bagley for seeding the ideas in this paragraph.
Bill Sage inspired many of the thoughts in this paragraph.
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reporting?524 Could plaintiffs or prosecutors use the federal
false statements statute525 or the False Claims Act526 to punish
material inaccuracies or misleading data reporting by
regulated firms? Both laws are broad and powerful, and are
deployed in increasingly creative ways. Their use in database
reporting cases could raise novel statutory and due process
questions about the procedural safeguards agencies have
selected for specific databases. Moreover, such actions could be
undermined by how agencies themselves “characterize” the
data, including any disclaimers about the accuracy, reliability,
or objectivity of the data.
B.

Characterizing the Data

Because not all data will be objective in nature, verifiable,
or even worth the cost of verifying, it is equally important that
agencies accurately characterize the data they present, listing
the sources and any important context or limitations for the
data.
1. Identifying Sources
Databases should be labeled and characterized accurately,
much as we expect of product labeling by industry.527 This is
particularly so because government agencies are one of the
most trusted sources of information, and the information they
publish carries the imprimatur of the federal government.528
Thus, agency databases should clearly identify the sources of
their data. Agency databases should also indicate whether the
data are contested, and detail steps the agency takes (or, more
importantly, does not take) to resolve such contests.529

524. For a discussion of this possibility, see Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains
for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682
(2013).
525. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). Kristin Madison discusses the possibility of
prosecutors using the False Claims Act to punish misreporting of quality data in
pay-for-performance or value-based purchasing programs under Medicare. See
Madison, supra note 472, at 692.
526. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
527. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012) (prohibiting food labeling from being
false or misleading).
528. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 94.
529. Id. at 96.
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Data sets that do not purport to be accurate or objective
might require special precautions. Federal databases can be
populated with data from a variety of sourcesincluding
consumers, regulated parties, or the agency itselfand each
might require different quality controls and presentations.530
For example, the FDA’s adverse event databases are populated
by reports from manufacturers and users that a product may
have been “associated” with an adverse event, without any firm
claims as to causation.531 Similarly, being listed in the CFPB’s
Consumer Complaint Database does not mean that a company
has committed any legal violation; many complaints are simply
“vague expressions of being wronged.”532 Just like the FDA
does not verify whether a product caused a specific adverse
event, the CFPB does not verify that a company even engaged
in the conduct alleged in the consumer complaint. Doctors
subject to “report cards” also lament that death and
complication rates are presented without being normalized for
treating riskier patient populations.533 Should such “data” even
be published? For better or worse, routinely they are.
2. Explaining Context, Limitations
The solution, perhaps, is for agencies to represent the data
accurately, which often means explaining the context and any
limitations of the data. Several agencies already endeavor to do
so. For example, in the FDA’s medical device database, the
agency notes that its “surveillance system has limitations,
including the potential submission of incomplete, inaccurate,
untimely, unverified, or biased data.”534 The FDA’s adverse
drug event database also notes that “there is no certainty that
the reported event . . . was actually due to the product.”535
Likewise, the CFPB disclaims that “[w]e don’t verify all the
facts alleged in these complaints but we take steps to confirm a
530. Id.
531. See discussion supra Section IV.F.
532. CORTEZ, supra note 143, at 69–70; Porter, supra note 163, at 78.
533. Sandeep Jauhar, Opinion, Giving Doctors Grades, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/opinion/giving-doctors-grades.html
[perma.cc/WH3T-Q6NJ]. Although death and complication rate data are usually
normalized through various methodologies, physicians frequently object that such
methodologies are inadequate.
534. MAUDE, supra note 448.
535. FAERS, supra note 441.
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commercial relationship between the consumer and the
company.”536 Congress requires the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov
database to “provide clear and conspicuous notice to users of
the database that the Commission does not guarantee the
accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the
database.”537 Although one court called the CPSC’s language
“boilerplate” that “would not interest an ordinary consumer,”538
providing appropriate context and disclosing the limitations of
data is relatively easy and helps answer several criticisms of
disclosure noted in Part III.
A “reliable” database may depend not only on publishing
accurate data (if that is what it purports to do), but also on
publishing relatively complete and representative data.
Industry commenters, for example, objected that the CFPB’s
database of self-selected consumer complaints would
necessarily
be
incomplete,
nonrandom,
and
thus
nonrepresentative of company performance and consumer
experiences.539 The CFPB responded that the data are not
portrayed as such, and promised to “inform consumers and any
other public database users that the data reflect only the . . .
complaints that consumers submit to the Bureau.”540
Data selection or filtering criteria might thus generate
published data that are technically accurate but misleading as
a whole. Transparency initiatives often fail when
“transparency is either not sufficiently mandatory or not
applicable to categories of information that meaningfully
contribute to public accountability.”541 Agencies with discretion
to disclose information may tend to disclose “information that
makes the administration look public spirited, effective, and
efficient, but withhold information to the contrary.”542 The data
chosen for publication may not paint a complete or
representative picture. Thus, as Shkabatur argues, the answer
for
incomplete
transparency
may
be
even
more
536. Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 312.
537. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(b)(5) (2012).
538. Co. Doe v. Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d 572, 598 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Co. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
539. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 37,616 (June 22, 2012).
540. Id.
541. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 105–06.
542. Adam Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms
for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 919 (2006); Shkabatur, supra note
55, at 106.
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transparency.543 She finds support among scholars who argue
that Congress should place affirmative disclosure duties on
agencies, shifting away from the “passive” disclosure required
by laws like FOIA that have been rendered as anachronisms in
the Internet era.544 If it is neither possible nor cost-effective to
publish comprehensive or representative data, the agency
should provide adequate context for what is being published
and explain why the dataset is incomplete.
C.

Presenting the Data

Policymakers should also consider the “outputs” of agency
databaseshow the data will be published, presented, and
used. Thoughtful designs will evaluate the optimal format, size,
and scope of the database, as well as the target audiences and
their potential uses.
1. Raw or Polished?
First, data can be published in raw or relatively polished
formats, with gradations in between. Should agencies rely on
massive raw data dumps targeted at more sophisticated users?
Or should they package, stylize, and distill the data for lay
users? The trend, as noted above, is to publish data sets in both
more polished, packaged formats and in raw, open data
formats. The former requires agencies to think carefully about
how to convey the information, and in what packagingwhich
inevitably raises costs and includes normative judgment calls
that might draw into question how objective or neutral the
presentation is. But the latter (publishing raw data) is a
relatively recent phenomenon.
Historically, agencies have been reluctant to publish
information in open, raw, machine-readable data formats
(particularly information requested via FOIA). For example,
2011 congressional testimony revealed that “[m]ost requests for
correspondence and other documents are fulfilled by printing
them, redacting, then re-scanning into unsearchable

543.
544.

See generally Shkabatur, supra note 55.
See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1828–29.
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images.”545 Yet, as far back as 2004, the OMB encouraged
agencies to “provide all data in an open, industry standard
format permitting users to aggregate, disaggregate, or
otherwise manipulate and analyze the data to meet their
needs.”546 And scholars continue to argue for agencies to
publish data online in open, structured, and machine-readable
formats such as XML, consistent with the Open Government
Working Group’s recommendations.547 Thus, there is a clear
trend toward publishing in raw, open formats.
At the same time, some scholars argue that publishing
data in raw, “naked” formats can itself serve as a barrier to
access for nonprogrammers and others who are not able to
understand or use such data.548 Raw government datasets
might
require,
ironically,
technically
sophisticated
intermediaries to decipher.549 Thus, open government efforts
that encourage agencies to present data in a raw, naked, and
“neutral” way may erect separate barriers to accessing and
understanding the information.
A related idea is that government transparency can exist
on different planes, from “relative” to “absolute.” Relative
transparency occurs when someoneusually the government
or a data intermediary“relates” the data from one reporting
entity to another for easy comparison. For example, star
ratings, grades, and other distilling criteria essentially grade
reporting entities on a curve. To wit, most users would
understand that a hospital receiving one out of five stars on
overall quality underperforms most other hospitals. But it is
545. The Freedom of Information Act: Ensuring Transparency and
Accountability in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sarah Cohen, Knight Professor of the Practice of
Journalism, Duke University), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/113-15%20Cohen%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7PM-9SNM].
546. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
MEMORANDUM M-05-04, POLICIES FOR FEDERAL AGENCY PUBLIC WEBSITES 4
(2004), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/20
05/m05-04) [https://perma.cc/B6PN-37HC].
547. See, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 518, at 167 (arguing that original
data should be posted in documents in XML formats with unique and permanent
addresses); The Annotated 8 Principles of Open Government Data, OPEN GOV’T
WORKING GRP., http://opengovdata.org/index.php/OpenDataPrinciples (last visited
Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5YEA-HMJ6] (recommending that data be
complete, primary, timely accessible, machine-readable, non-discriminatory, nonproprietary, and license-free).
548. See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 112.
549. Id.
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much more difficult for users to understand what a two percent
complication rate associated with cardiac surgeries performed
at a specific facility should signal, as an absolute number. Of
course, even “relative” transparency may not be particularly
useful. If HospitalCompare.gov lists a hospital’s mortality rates
as “[n]o different than the national average,” that might signal
to users that they should not worry about that factor when
selecting a hospital. But it could also mean that the national
average is equally disappointing for everyone. Moreover,
“relative” transparency is only realized after gathering
“absolute” data points. But who should take on the task of
turning absolute, raw data into relative, packaged
comparisons?550
Some argue that the government should focus its energies
less on presenting packaged information and more on
publishing “reusable data.”551 The idea, inspired by the
engineering principle that separates data from interaction, is
that agencies should worry less about designing user-friendly
websites, and more about releasing raw data for
nongovernmental users.552 Robinson and colleagues argue that
the latter will be better able to experiment with how to present
the data effectively, whether it be with advanced search
functionalities, automated content analysis, indexing among
multiple sources, and various data visualization tools.553 They
call this new role for agencies an “invisible hand,” enabling a
“marketplace of engineering ideas.”554 Some users will also
value being able to access “genuine” data that is not mediated,
framed, or translated by an intermediary (including, or even
particularly, by the government).555

550. I credit Kristin Madison with raising the notion of “relative” versus
“absolute” transparency, which parallels some of the considerations when deciding
whether to prioritize publishing raw versus polished data sets. Larry Lessig also
touches on this dynamic when comparing campaign finance data (absolute) with
EPA fuel economy stickers on new cars (relative). See LESSIG, supra note 260, at
257–58.
551. Robinson et al., supra note 518, at 160.
552. Id. at 161.
553. Id. at 161, 169.
554. Id. at 161.
555. Id. at 174. Fenster discusses how the process of the government
communicating information necessarily involves imperfect judgment calls about
what information to disclose and how. Fenster, supra note 26, at 926–27.
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2. Big Data or Small Data?
Disclosure enthusiasts often assume that more is better.
But recently, scholars have begun to acknowledge that it is
more important that information be accessible and usable,
rather than simply available.556 Perhaps the relevant question,
then, is not what policymakers think users need to know, but
what users want to know.557 Disclosure policies that consider
what information users want, and what they can comprehend,
tend to be more successful over time.558
Moreover, perhaps consumers do not necessarily need
more data, but more advice.559 The opposite of making data
“bigger,” of course, is making data “smaller”usually by
simplifying, tailoring, and targeting the information to make it
easier to process.560 Thus, rating systems and other
information made available at the point of purchase could be
particularly useful for consumers.561 Mere publication on a
government website might not be particularly useful, unless
intermediaries make the data available where and when it can
be used. Such information is more likely to become embedded
in the decisions targeted by the disclosure.562 Thus, databases
that allow users to simplify complex information, or that allow
experts to easily convert it to actionable advice (such as a
ratings system or a reliable heuristic), will be more successful
in achieving regulatory goals.563 Restaurant hygiene grades, for
example, are more embedded in the decision of where to eat
than complex and voluminous patient safety disclosures are in
the decision of where to seek medical care.564
Despite the current fascination with “big data,” many also
appeal for simplification. Agencies are thinking more carefully
today about ensuring the “utility” of data, perhaps owing in

556. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 1344; Fenster, supra note 26, at 942.
557. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 746.
558. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
559. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 746.
560. Madison, supra note 30, at 1621–22 (noting astutely that recent laws like
the Affordable Care Act include language like “patient-centered” and “patient
engagement,” which can be code for making big data smaller).
561. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 57.
562. Id. at 65–74.
563. Id. at 57.
564. Id. at 65.
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part to the IQA.565 Moreover, notions of “utility” continue to
evolve. For example, the Nutrition Facts label on food products
has had some modest successconsumers report that they are
increasingly aware of nutrition labeling and make decisions
based on it.566 Still, as Ben-Shahar and Schneider note, even
with nutrition labeling, which they call “the simplest and most
understandable case of daily disclosures,” studies still find high
levels of consumer confusion that largely correlate with low
consumer literacy and numeracy.567 How much should these
findings deter agency disclosure efforts?
In general, ratings systems that communicate data that
has been simplified and “translated” for lay users seem to enjoy
moderate success.568 For example, there is evidence that simple
letter grades for restaurant sanitation (from “A” to “C”) have
led to cleaner restaurants in Los Angeles County.569
Restaurants with high letter grades posted in their store
windows saw an increase in revenues, and conversely,
restaurants with the lowest “C” grades saw a decrease.570 More
tellingly, prominent disclosure of these grades encouraged
restaurants to improve their sanitation practices, which
correlated with a significant local drop in hospitalizations
related
to
food-borne
illnesses.571
Thus,
simple,
comprehensible, and easily accessible ratings not only allowed
565. The IQA required the OMB to issue government-wide guidelines for
“ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information . . . disseminated by federal agencies.” Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 3516.
566. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 675.
567. Id. at 675–76 (citing Gary Jones & Miles Richardson, An Objective
Examination of Consumer Perception of Nutrition Information Based on
Healthiness Ratings and Eye Movements, 10 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 238 (2007);
Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley, Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition
Labeling: A Systematic Review, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 21, 23 (2005); Russell
L. Rothman et al., Patient Understanding of Food Labels: The Role of Literacy and
Numeracy, 31 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 391, 391 (2006)).
568. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 743.
569. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 743; Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip
Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant
Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (studying sanitation grades in
Los Angeles County).
570. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 50 (citing studies).
571. Id. Note, however, that studies of other local restaurant grading efforts
have found them to be less successful. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge:
Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012)
(examining similar efforts in multiple cities).

2018]

REGULATION BY DATABASE

87

consumers to vote with their wallets, but also encouraged
restaurants to compete based on cleanlinessundoubtedly the
underlying motivation of the letter grade system.572
For disclosure policies to succeed on multiple levels, then,
they must affect not only the decision-making of consumers
and regulatory beneficiaries, but also the decision-making of
the discloserthe regulated party.573 Thus, effective disclosure
systems become “doubly embedded.”574 The way disclosure
policies affect discloser behavior is intuitiveby affecting their
profits, market share, and/reputation.575 Disclosers may
change their behavior, in fact, simply in anticipation that
releasing information may affect one of these three things.
Thus, agencies may choose two very different courses:
massive raw data dumps intended for sophisticated
intermediaries, or highly distilled presentations intended for
lay users. The correct choice, if one must be made, depends
very much on the data and what the agency hopes to achieve by
publishing it.
On one hand, simplified ratings or grades are able to distill
dozens or even hundreds of different complex criteria into a
single understandable metric, like restaurant hygiene grades,
hospital star ratings, or five-star crash safety ratings, which
are based on complex engineering standards and test
results.576 Ratings and grades also combat the problem of
overdisclosure. Scholars that have evaluated the effectiveness
of mandatory disclosure regimes sometimes observe that
parties can “overdisclose” information to try to “overwhelm and
distract” the intended audience.577 Ratings can ameliorate this
problem.
On the other hand, sometimes efforts to make the complex
more understandable fail, as evidenced by the vague five-color
scheme for communicating the threat of a terrorist attack.578
Unlike dirty restaurants or unsafe cars, it is hard for most
people to understand the significance of the terror threat

572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
790.
578.

FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 50–51.
Id. at 65–74.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 59–61.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 700; Willis, supra note 231, at
FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 61.
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changing from yellow to orange, and more importantly, how to
act on that signal.579 Thus, not all data is so easily distilled.
Given these considerations, should agencies design
databases to be accessible to the lay public, or to be used by
more sophisticated information intermediaries? An ideal
answer is “both,” of course. To maximize accessibility, the data
should be available in multiple formats, as many agencies now
recognize, and as Data.gov demonstrates. If “both” is not a
feasible option, the agency must decide whether “big data” or
“small data” better achieve regulatory ends, including the
relative costs of both approaches.
3. Intermediaries and Collaborative Data
Designing databases for use by third-party information
intermediaries is compelling for several reasons.580 Publiclyminded watchdogs like Pro Publica, the Sunlight Foundation,
and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) can serve a
translational role, sifting large amounts of data into more
understandable bits.581 Although these organizations focus on
government transparency, they also can (and do in fact) help
extract and translate information about regulated parties.582
Even complex datasets that are not translated by agencies into
ratings, grades, or other digestible metrics can be translated by
thoughtful intermediaries. For example, various consumer
groups have tried to translate toxic release data into more
user-friendly websites.583 Thus, even raw data sets can be
579. Id.
580. For an early discussion of the use of data intermediaries, see Sage, supra
note 5, at 1737–41.
581. See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 118.
582. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein et al., Dollars for Docs, PRO PUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/ (last visited June 6, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/W7UC-SSBF]. The Dollars for Docs project at Pro Publica posts a
searchable database of physicians that have received money from pharmaceutical
and device firms, using data reported under federal law, including the Physician
Payment Sunshine Act. CMS released the data, but Pro Publica gathers it in a
single searchable database with rankings and analysis. See Charles Ornstein &
Ryann Grochowski Jones, About the Dollars for Docs Data, PRO PUBLICA (July 1,
2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/about-the-dollars-for-docs-data [https://
perma.cc/6TYP-8LHQ].
583. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 62; The Pollution Information Site,
SCORECARD, http://scorecard.goodguide.com (last visited July 16, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/B7B8-7375]; The Right-to-Know Network, HOUS. CHRON.,
http://www.rtknet.org (last visited July 16, 2017) [http://perma.cc/VL8P-QJBT].
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repurposed for lay users like consumers and other regulatory
beneficiaries. Indeed, Fung, Graham, and Weil found that the
most successful disclosure regimes “featured strong groups
representing information users, offered benefits to at least
some information disclosers, and provided comprehensible
content.”584
However, translating voluminous, complex government
data requires not only minimum technical and programming
expertise, but also a basic understanding of the agency and its
regulatory framework (and perhaps also an understanding of
the regulated industry). The number of organizations that can
fit comfortably into such a Venn diagram might be quite small.
Indeed, even proponents of publishing raw government data
concede that it is not immediately accessible to most lay
users.585 And some doubt that these organizations derive their
value from information supplied by the government, rather
than from their own surveys and information-collecting
activities.586 Still, the fact that there are individuals like
Joshua Tauberer (who created Govtrack.us in his spare
time)587 and Carl Malamud (who painstakingly made SEC data
available online)588 demonstrate that the barriers are far from
insurmountable. Moreover, these extraordinary individual
efforts inspired the government to publish the data in open
formats.589
Unsurprisingly, agencies are also discovering that data is
becoming a more collaborative endeavor. There is optimism
that once raw data is published, the private, public, and
nonprofit sectors will make the data more accessible and useful
to their constituents.590 Fung and colleagues note what
happened with the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory, as consumer
groups like Scorecard and RTK refined the data and made it
more user friendly, while the Chemical Manufacturers
Association launched its own site emphasizing not only

584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xiv.
Robinson et al., supra note 518, at 173.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 731–32.
Robinson et al., supra note 518, at 165–66, 171.
Id. at 166, 171.
Id. at 171.
FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 153.
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companies’ improving safety data, but also the number of jobs
they created and taxes they paid by ZIP code.591
As such, we might be experiencing a major shift in the
government’s informational role from controller to facilitator.592
Indeed, modern agencies may be best suited to facilitating
rather than controlling informationthat is, gathering and
publishing data, ensuring its quality, and then enabling the
private and nonprofit sectors to maximize its uses.593 Data
users might also become contributors, as in the case of
consumers who report food poisoning from restaurants and
thus
supplement
relatively
infrequent
restaurant
594
inspections.
Just as the CFPB endeavors, the government
can serve as an aggregator of disparate data sources.
Craswell calls this “government-aided disclosures (GADs),”
in which the government creates a baseline for disclosure, but
allows companies to use the information dynamically or go
beyond the baseline in some way.595 Such disclosures are
mandated by government but are also integrated by disclosers
because the information is useful to consumers or users.596
Another factor that improves success is whether the
information varies between disclosers, such that disclosers
have an incentive to race to the top.597 Cigarette brands have
little incentive to highlight the Surgeon General’s mandatory
warnings, because the same preset warnings rotate among all
products regardless of manufacturer, but they may have more
incentive to reduce the tar and nicotine content of their
products, which varies from brand to brand.598 Thus, data can
serve as an important differentiator between competitors, and
they might spend their own resources publicizing
differences.599 Again, if databases aspire to affect underlying
behavior and achieve regulatory ends, this is one way to do so.
In some notable instances, the federal government devotes
remarkable resources to encourage users to collect and deploy
591. Id. at 158–60.
592. Indeed, Sage long ago called attention to the government’s role as a data
facilitator. Sage, supra note 5, at 1712.
593. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 166.
594. Id.
595. Craswell, supra note 18, at 369.
596. Id. at 369–70.
597. Id. at 371.
598. Id.
599. Id. at 370–71.
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certain data, as in the case of electronic health records (EHRs).
Through various pieces of legislation,600 Congress not only
established standards for collecting and using electronic health
records, but also devoted billions in incentivesan average of
more than $40,000 per physician.601
Extending the principle even further, the federal site
HealthData.gov aggregates over 2,000 unique datasets from
agencies like the CDC, CMS, FDA, and numerous state and
local governments.602 The goal is to put open, machine-readable
data in the hands of programmers, entrepreneurs, journalists,
providers, scientists, consumers, and other policymakers who
might, in turn, help improve health care in the United
States.603 Thus, given the current fascination with “big data,” it
helps to remember that countless government agencies (and
Congress) are helping to make data “bigger,” consonant with
their traditional goal of providing public goods.604
The next generation of disclosure will thus be more
collaborative, in the sense that various sectors will both
contribute to and use the data.605 Indeed, there seems to be
wide agreement that the government should not have a
monopoly on generating data,606 but can play an important
centripetal role in compiling data and helping assure their
quality.
CONCLUSION
Agency databases have proliferated on the belief that
markets, regulation, and democracy all thrive on
transparencythat sunlight is the best disinfectant. Ideally,

600. Most notably the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
601. Madison, supra note 30, at 1618; David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner,
The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 501, 501 (2010).
602. Datasets, HEALTHDATA.GOV, http://www.healthdata.gov/dataset?f%5B0%
5D=type%3Adataset (last visited July 15, 2017) [http://perma.cc/G936-V2TJ]
(sorted by “Publisher”).
603. About, HEALTHDATA.GOV, http://www.healthdata.gov/content/about (last
visited July 15, 2017) [http://perma.cc/B629-5EXX].
604. Madison, supra note 30, at 1620–21; Sage, supra note 5, at 1771
(discussing the public good nature of information in the health industry).
605. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 153.
606. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 4, at 199–200.
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shining a light on things like campaign contributions,
pollution, and hospital outcomes will encourage more optimal
behavioror at least deter the worst of it. An added benefit is
that “regulation by database” avoids the costs and formalities
of traditional regulation.
But as transparency has moved onlinebecoming more
pervasive, more powerful, and more burdened with regulatory
dimensionswe also must recognize that sunlight can also
blind or even burn. The case studies demonstrate how
problems with accuracy, fairness, and efficacy can undermine
even well-established, well-meaning data regimes. These
problems can be avoided if agencies act less like passive
publishers or repositories for data, and more like data stewards
actively tending to a valuable (and dynamic) public good.
Policymakers must embrace the government’s role as a
data steward, a sentinel that helps maximize the quality and
reliability of data inputs and outputs via administrative
safeguards. Thinking carefully about publication procedures,
how to balance the interests of both subjects and users, how to
present the data accurately and fairly, and how to maximize
uses by audiences of varying sophistication can be just as
resource-intensive as traditional regulation. But these steps
are necessary for data to achieve “regulatory” ends. The more
reliable government data are, the more they can enlighten us
and deter unwanted behavior.

